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I. INTRODUCTION
Securitization' was invented in the early 1970s.2 Since then, the
transaction volume has exploded. By the end of 1994, more than $1.9 trillion
securitization securities were outstanding, and more than $500 billion of
securitization transactions were done in 1994 alone.3 And securitization is
expected to remain a significant source of financing in the years to come.4
1. A great deal has been written about securitization, both by academics and practitioners. In
fact, LEXIS devotes a database (Fedsec Library, Cmo File) exclusively to the securitization of
mortgages. One major treatise on securitization is TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Another treatise on this subject is SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES (Ronald S. Borod ed., 1994) [hereinafter Borod, SECURITIZATION]. Steven L. Schwarcz, a
leading scholar and practitioner in the field, has also written extensively on securitization. STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (2d ed.
1993); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of.Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How
Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital
Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139 [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Divisible Interests]; see also STANDARD & POOR'S, S&P's STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA (1988)
[hereinafter S&P'S CRITERIA]; STRUCTURED FINANCING (Law Journal Seminars-Press 1987); George
J. Benston, The Future of Asset Securitization: The Benefits and Costs of Breaking Up the Bank, 5 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 71 (1992); Committee on Bankr. and Corp. Reorg. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527 (1995) [hereinafter Financing
Techniques]; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Cotletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues, and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369 (1991); Robert B. Titus, Asset Securitization: Marvel
of the Marketplace, But Should We Be Uneasy? 73 B.U. L. REV. 271 (1993) (reviewing FRANKEL,
supra).
2. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 2A.2 ("True securitization by pooling ... began in the
1970s.... ."). However, securitization has its roots in transaction structures in use in the 1200s. Id. §
6.2. Indeed, transactions sharing some of securitizations' features have been "with us since the
nineteenth century." Id. § 2.1. The history of securitization in its current form is discussed in Appendix
D, infra.
3. See infra Appendix A.
4. Shenker and Colletta note that "[o]ne observer projects that before the end of this decade at
least eighty percent of all new loans are likely to be securitized." Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at
1372 (citing the testimony of Lowell L. Bryan of McKinsey & Co. before the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urb. Affairs, Oct. 1987); see also FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 1.4; ROBERT E. LITAN, THE
REVOLUTION IN U.S. FINANCE 20-23, 36-43 (1991).
Securitization involves two types of securities: mortgage-backed securities, and asset-backed
securities. Historically, mortgage-backed securities have represented the vast bulk of securitization
transactions. See infra Appendix A. However, primarily due to the movement of interest rates, the
mortgage-backed securities market has recently been "in the doldrums," with issuance of mortgage-
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Securitization is a technique firms use to raise financing. In securitization
transactions, financiers purchase securities payable from collections on a
firm's receivables. Contrasted with many other financing techniques,
securitization looks very complex.' Complexity is rarely, if ever, costless. If
financing decisions are made rationally, securitization transactions must offer
benefits that simpler financing techniques do not.
Practitioners tout securitization's ability to enable: (1) a low quality firm
to, in effect, issue high quality securities, and (2) cash flow streams saleable
only at sizeable discounts on lower priced financial markets to be transformed
into securities saleable at much smaller discounts on higher priced capital
markets.' The claim, more generally, is that securitization is a method for
packaging cash flow streams of receivables for higher valued (and. higher
priced) uses, at a cost lower than the increment of value added.7
The famous Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevance theorem
holds that capital structure-the way a firm carves up its cash outflows into
backed securities falling 64% in the 12 month ending Aug. 31, 1995. Stephanie Strom, CS First
Boston Newcomer to Build Mortgage Products, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at D6. The "slack" has, to
a small extent, been taken up by increases in the issuance of asset-backed securities. See Tom Pratt,
Wall Street's Deep Freeze, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 9, 1995 at 12; Anita Raghavan, Sales of
Asset-Backed Issues Boom, but Mortgages Stall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at C12.
5. There are different definitions of securitization. My definition is broader than some, and
narrower than others. Frankel includes in her definition different sorts of transactions, such as loan
participations, but concentrates largely on loan receivables owed to banks. FRANKEL, supra note 1,
§ 1.2. My definition deals not only with what Frankel calls securitization by pooling, but also
addresses receivables other than loans, and obligees other than banks. My definition accords with that
of Shenker and Colletta:
We will define "securitization" for our analysis as the sale of equity or debt instruments,
representing ownership interests in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of
assets, in a transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or lending
against the underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily marketable and,
thus, more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets.
Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1374-75.
Appendix B illustrates a typical securitization transaction.
6. See generally JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT
(1988); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1 (emphasizing increased access to capital markets).
7. Some commentators think securitization's benefits have been oversold. See Benston, supra
note 1; see also David W. Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World Debt,
1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 173 (expressing skepticism at securitization's ability to easily transform
poorly performing third world debt into higher quality debt). Schwarcz notes that Benston's criticisms,
while apt, may apply only to a subset of securitization transactions. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1,
at 134 n.5 (asserting that Benston's analysis is limited to the costs and benefits of securitizing a bank's
own loans to its customers and, therefore, is misleading when applied to the broader universe of
securitization transactions).
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one or more layers of debt or equity-is irrelevant to firm value.' Financing
transactions, such as securitization, are the principal means by which firms
create their capital structures. In a Modigliani and Miller world, securitization
would not exist, as it would offer no advantages over less costly alternatives.
Of course, the real world has a plethora of different capital structures. It is
highly implausible that an entire industry devoted to inventing and selecting
capital structures is wasting its time and a great deal of other people's money.
Modigliani and Miller's result only applies in an idealized world where
certain unrealistic (and in some cases, obviously false) assumptions are true.'
Included among the assumptions is the absence of many real-world costs,
such as information costs, transaction costs, and, implicitly, agency and
regulatory costs. Academics use the Modigliani and Miller theorem as a
framework to consider which of its assumptions might be violated for
particular capital structures-which real world costs a particular capital
structure may help reduce.
The academic work on capital structure has largely focused on broad
categories: debt versus equity, secured debt versus unsecured debt, and senior
debt versus junior debt. Some academics think they have found the
Modigliani and Miller assumptions such capital structures violate; others are
more skeptical, and consider the "puzzle" of capital structure unresolved.'
There has been some work on the narrower categories involved in more
complex capital structures, but little dealing with the features of a particular
transaction structure. There has, however, been work done on the
securitization transaction structure by a leading scholar and practitioner in the
field, Steven L. Schwarcz. This article takes Schwarcz's work as a point of
departure. Schwarcz in effect characterizes securitization as exploiting the
8. The seminal article is Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). See infra Part
V.A.
9. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text Shupack describes the Modigliani and Miller
assumptions as "heroic." Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures and the Question of Filing,
79 MINN. L. REV. 787, 789 n.5 (1995).
10. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986);
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88
YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (1986); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt,
37 VANE. L. REV. 1051 (1984). Finance academics also have done some work in this area. Their work,
while sometimes dealing with specific transaction structures, has not focused in much depth on the
non-quantitative terms of the transactions. See, e.g., Robert R. Moore, Asymmetric Information,
Repeated Lending, and Capital Structure, 25 1. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 393 (1993); Edgar
Norton, Factors Affecting Capital Structure Decisions, 26 FIN. REV. 431 (1991).
[VOL. 74:1061
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"spread" between financing costs in different markets;" I consider the sources
of the "spread," and how securitization might help exploit it at lower cost.
I use a Modigliani and Miller framework to analyze securitization
transactions, identifying the real-world costs securitization could help reduce.
Regulatory cost reductions are apparently a large part of the securitization
story. Securitization in its present form was essentially created in the 1970s as
part of U.S. Government efforts to encourage a secondary market in
mortgages.' 2 Even now, a significant percentage of mortgage securitization
transactions effectively enjoy government subsidies. 3 Moreover, regulatory
benefits may be a factor in many other securitization transactions. If
securitization's main effect was to take skillful advantage of regulatory
benefits, it would be more a triumph for practitioners than a phenomenon of
interest to academics. 4 I argue, however, that securitization offers significant
nonregulatory (efficiency) benefits as well. The largest such benefits seem to
involve reductions of information costs.
The magnitude of securitization's efficiency benefits is hard to measure.
For firms with many other financing possibilities, the benefits seem quite
small. The more financiers (and prospective financiers) a firm has, the more
widely available information about the firm is likely to be. Indeed, such firms
seem often to use securitization as one more way to arbitrage small
differences in financing markets. 5 In these cases, securitization may merely
be no more costly than the alternatives.
The efficiency benefits seem largest for firms with the fewest alternative
11. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1; see also Shupack, supra note 9, at 809.
12. See infra Appendix D, § 1.
13. Id.; see also MEIR KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 625 (1994); Michael
Carroll, Masters of Beltway Capitalism, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1995, at 60.
14. One account of securitization's benefits is that securitization exploits clientele effects (that is,
systematically different investor preferences); the effect given as an example is the regulatory regimes
that encourage many of the largest investors, such as insurance companies, money market mutual
funds, and pension plans, to favor higher rated securities. See Shupack, supra note 9, at 815. As
discussed in Part IV.B.2.b, infra, the regulatorily-inspired demand may have caused a demand
premium. Securitization is a way to issue highly rated securities; thus, firms could use securitization to
capture part of this demand premium. But firms have many ways of issuing higher-rated securities.
The issued securities can be accorded a high priority, backed by high-quality collateral, insured, or
otherwise credit enhanced. An account, therefore, is needed, as to why securitization is a better way to
achieve higher ratings. My account considers, but does not rely on, clientele effects to explain
securitization; rather, it points to various cost savings, particularly in information costs, to show how
higher quality and higher ratings could be achieved more cheaply by securitization.
15. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
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financing possibilities.' 6 Available information about such finns is often
limited (as is the case for smaller firs), unfavorable (as is the case for firms
in financial distress), or particularly difficult to appraise (as is the case for
firms in volatile industries or firms potentially subject to large liabilities).
These fims have the most severe "lemons' 17 problems: potential investors
fear that what they do not know can hurt them. And those fears are costlier to
dispel. But comparatively few of those fears involve the firm's receivables.
Thus, fears associated with the receivables can be dispelled at far lower cost
than other fears associated with the firm.'8 Securitization removes, and
sweetens, a slice from the lemon-while leaving the remainder not
appreciably sourer than it was before.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an overview of
securitization transactions. Part III describes the terms of securitization
transactions. These two sections are for readers desiring an understanding of
the transaction structure and its complexities. Part IV contains the main
argument of this Article: it explains the source of securitization's benefits
using a Modigliani and Miller framework. Part V offers concluding remarks.
This Article also contains 4 appendices: Appendix A is a chart setting forth
the dollar amounts of securitization securities (i) issued in 1994, and (ii)
outstanding as of December 31, 1994; Appendix B illustrates a typical
securitization transaction; Appendix C illustrates other financing structures;
and Appendix D describes the historical and regulatory context in which the
present-day securitization transaction structure was created.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS
Finns 9 can raise money in a variety of ways.2" They can issue stock,
16. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note I, at 134; Shupack, supra note 9, at 809.
17. The seminal exposition of the lemons problem is George A. Akerlof, The Market for
"Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
18. Receivables are, nearly tautologically, less costly to appraise than a firm containing
receivables. Lemons firms are costlier to appraise than nonlemons firms, but appraisal of the
receivables of lemons firms may not be commensurately costlier than appraisal of receivables of
nonlemons finns. Thus, I argue that securitization permits greater aggregate information cost
reductions for lemons firms' financiers than for nonlemons firms' financiers. See infra Part W.B.1.
19. I use the term "firm" generically to mean an entity, whether in corporate, partnership, or other
organizational form, which wishes to raise funds.
20. Appendix C illustrates typical financing structures, ranging from a simple stock sale to more
complex secured loan and sale leaseback structures.
[VOL. 74:1061
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borrow money,2' sell assets (and lease them back), and sell rights to receive
future monies. Raising money by selling rights to receive future monies
(which is called "factoring" 22) is, in its simplest form, one of the oldest
financing techniques.' Securitization is, in a sense, a type of factoring.
In a securitization transaction, a firm sells24 its rights to receive certain
future monies (receivables) to an entity (the "pool"'). The pool's assets
consist almost entirely of the receivables. The receivables often, but not
always, have similar terms, maturities, and other salient characteristics.26
The pool sells interests ("pool securities"27) to investors; 2 the sales may
be private placements or public offerings. Purchasers of pool securities may
be institutional investors (such as pension funds, insurance companies, and
21. A firm can borrow money from banks, institutional investors (insurance companies, mutual
funds, or pension funds), or other investors. In connection with a borrowing, a firm may grant a
security interest in some or all of its assets.
22. "Factoring" refers to the sale or assignment of accounts receivable, and the buyer of the
accounts is the "factor." See PETER M. BISCOE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF CREDIT FACTORING (1975).
23. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1. at 144; see also DONALD KIESO & HENRY WEYGANDT,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 342 (8th ed. 1995).
24. The seller often is, but need not be, the entity who originally extended the loan or credit (the
"originator"). Some pools are comprised of receivables from multiple originators, or multiple sellers.
See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 140. Such pools may be used by a group of firms, no one of
whom has sufficient receivables to make a securitization transaction worthwhile. My discussion of the
securitization transaction structure omits separate consideration of multiple seller or multiple originator
pools; however, it should be noted that these involve added complexities and costs.
25. The pool can be a corporation, a trust, or a partnership, but is often a trust. See infra Part
IV.B.2.a for a discussion of certain benefits arising from the use of a trust.
26. Increasingly, different types of more heterogeneous receivables are being securitized. See,
e.g., Lyn Perlmuth, Pumping Up the ABS, INSTITurIoNAL INVESTOR, May 1995, at 36 (growth in
securitization of lower-rated auto loan receivables); Bucking the Trend, Asset-Backed Securities Climb
25% to $75 Billion, ASSET SALES REP., Jan. 9, 1995, at 1 (growth in securitization of auto leases and
student loans); Monolines Look to Expand Horizons within ABS, ASSET SALES REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 6
(securitization of international receivables) [hereinafter Monolines]. I consider the added complexities
involved in transactions with heterogeneous receivables in Part W.B.1, infra.
27. I use the term "pool securities," "securities issued by a pool" or "securitization securities" to
mean the interests acquired by investors in securitization transactions, regardless of the extent to which
the interests are "securities" for any or all purposes of the federal or state securities laws. Thus, my
definition may be broader in some respects, and less broad in others, than those of securities laws. For
instance, my use of the term "securities" includes commercial paper, which are short-term obligations
often exempted from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws.
28. In some transactions, the receivables may be sold to an entity which sells the receivables to
another entity; that second entity then sells the pool securities to investors. This dual entity structure is
used in a number of contexts, including some where the seller's financial condition is precarious.
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 142. My discussion of the securitization transaction structure
omits separate consideration of the dual entity structure; however, it should be noted that the structure
adds complexities and costs. I consider such structures briefly in Part IV.B.2.a, infra.
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mutual funds),29 or, sometimes, individuals. The pool securities represent
rights to receive payments from the receivables in the pool; however, the
terms of the pool securities are often significantly different from the terms of
the underlying receivables' The pool uses the proceeds from the sale of pool
securities to pay the firm for the receivables.
The pool securities can take many forms. They can be debt (senior or
subordinated), equity (in one or more classes), or debt or equity payable only
from the principal, or interest, on the pool receivables. The debt can be long
or short term, and it can carry a fixed or floating interest rate. The equity also
can have a stated interest rate. The debt is an obligation of the pool, secured
by the pool's assets, the receivables. The equity represents an interest in the
pool's assets.
The same pool can, and often does, have many different classes of pool
securities. The prospective purchasers of the pool securities, or an underwriter
or a placement agent anticipating sales of the pool securities,3 negotiate with
the seller as to the pool securities' terms. The terms of the pool securities are
also determined to some extent by the characteristics of the underlying
receivables. Particular payment schedules, for instance, may be more often
associated with pools of credit card receivables than pools of commercial
loans.32
New securities-ways of carving up the cash flow from the receivables-
are constantly being developed. Pools of mortgages, in particular, have
generated many classes of exotic securities. For instance, one pool might
issue securities: (i) payable only from principal payments made on the
mortgages; (ii) payable only from interest payments made on the mortgages;
(iii) with a fixed interest rate; (iv) with an interest rate adjusted in accordance
29. This contrasts with a factoring transaction, see supra note 22, where the buyers ("factors")
are specialists in buying receivables, and the sales are always private. But, as Schwarcz points out, the
distinction between factoring and securitization can sometimes blur. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1,
at 144. A private transaction with an investor who actively negotiates the transaction terms may, for
instance, be in form a securitization but in other respects quite close to factoring.
30. This also contrasts with factoring because factors acquire what the seller sells. For a
discussion of the relationship between the terms of securitization securities and those of the underlying
receivables, see infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
31. I omit discussion of underwriters and placement agents because their roles in securitization
transactions do not differ from their roles in other financing transactions in respects that would affect
my analysis. For a general discussion about the roles of underwriters and placement agents in
financing transactions, see 1A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION §§ 8.01-.09 (1996).
32. THE CHANGING MARKET IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 10 (R. Alton Gilbert ed., 1992)
[hereinafter, CHANGING MARKET].
[VOL. 74:1061
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with the movement of a specified floating rate index; and/or (v) with an
interest rate adjusted inversely to the movement of a specified floating rate
index.33
A pool containing receivables with an aggregate face value of $100
million will very rarely, if ever, issue pool securities with an aggregate face
value in excess of $100 million. Indeed, not infiequently, the receivables in
the pool have a face value in excess of the face value of the pool securities.
This excess amount is referred to as overcollateralization. In such cases, the
selling firm is given, in addition to the other consideration for the receivables,
a subordinated equity interest 4 in the pool,3" which it may retain or sell. 6 The
33. See KOHN, supra note 13, at 619-23; Peter Jordan & John Schiavetta, Derivative Investment
Policy in the Public Sector, GOV'T FIN. REV., Feb. 1995, at 44. One type of securitization transaction
involves the issuance of a "Collateralized Mortgage Obligation" ("CMOs"). The pool in such a
transaction consists of residential mortgages (or, sometimes, residential mortgage-backed securities).
One pool often issues many classes (tranches) of securities. See generally Bond Portfolio Analysis-
Mortgage Research, Salomon Brothers Inc., Collateralized Mortgage Obligations III: An Investor's
Guide, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET SECURITIZATION 273 (Robert L. Kuhn ed., 1990). Residential
mortgages have no prepayment penalties, and thus are often prepaid when interest rates decline. See
Roberta P. Brooks et al., Salomon Brothers Inc., Securitization Design for Commercial Mortgage
Securities, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET SECURITIZATION, supra, 184, 192. Investors will pay more for
pool securities whose payment schedules are more predictable. Thus, pools of residential mortgages
may be crafted in which junior securities "absorb" the prepayments so that the senior securities can
receive predictable payments. See id. at 198-200.
Interestingly, this problem does not arise with commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS").
Commercial mortgages are more difficult to securitize than residential mortgages. However, they
typically contain prepayment penalties. Thus, they are not prepaid as readily in response to interest rate
movements. For this reason a CMBS transaction typically would not contain as many tranches as a
CMO transaction. See generally Real Estate Investment: The Four Quadrants, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR. June 1996, at 61, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bis file.
34. The subordinated interest must be equity rather than debt. Transactions in which the
subordinated interest is debt will not qualify for a legal opinion that the conveyance of the receivables
is a "true sale" for bankruptcy purposes; such an opinion is necessary to the rating agencies rating the
transaction (and any insurer providing insurance) and to potential purchasers of the pool's securities.
35. If the selling firm's interest were not subordinated, the transaction would not receive "sales"
treatment for accounting purposes. The applicable standard is set forth by the Financial Accounting
Standard 77, promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") in Reporting by
Transferors for Transfers with Recourse, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 77
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 1983) [hereinafter FAS 77]. One of the requirements for sales
treatment under FAS 77 is that the transferor "surrenders control of the future economic benefits
embodied is considered to have surrendered control of the receivables." FAS 77, supra, § 5. A
transferor who acquires only a subordinated interest in the receivables' future economic benefits for
purposes of FAS 77. FASB standards are applicable to companies which use Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). Although most companies use GAAP, some specialized types of
companies may use other accounting principles in addition to or instead of GAAP. Banks, for instance,
use GAAP for public reporting purposes, but they are required to use Regulatory Accounting
Principles ("RAP") when preparing regulatory financial reports.
36. Obtaining sales treatment is harder under RAP than GAAP. RAP may prohibit the retention
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subordinated equity interest (the "B piece") represents the right to receive
amounts remaining in the pool after the more senior pool securities have been
paid.
Publicly offered pool securities are typically rated by one of the major
rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service or Standard and Poor's
Corporation.3 7 Privately offered pool securities are sometimes also rated, if
the investors so desire. 8 There are many possible grades of ratings.39 The
of the subordinated equity interest in cases where; GAAP would not. See Borod, SECURITIZATION,
supra note 1, § 2.02.D.1; FRANKEL, supra note 1, §§ 7.14.3, .4.
37. For a discussion of the supremacy of Moody's and Standard & Poor's and the attempts of
other companies to gain a toehold in the rating business, see Credit-Rating Agencies: Beyond the
Second Opinion, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 80. The other rating agencies, Duff& Phelps and
Fitch Investors Service, have made some inroads into the rating business. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra
note 1, at 136 n.14.
38. For instance, an insurance company, limited in its purchases of low or non-rated securities,
would likely want the seller to obtain a rating. This assumes, of course, that the rating obtained would
be sufficiently high. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 139 n.21; see also infra notes 39-43.
39. Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch's Investor Service, offer the following ratings:
S&P Moody's Fitch's
Highest quality, "gilt edged" AAA Aaa AAA
High quality AA Aa AA
Upper medium grade A A A
Medium grade BBB Baa BBB
Predominantly speculative BB Ba BB
Speculative, low grade B B B
Poor to default CCC Caa CCC
Highest speculation CC Ca CC
Lowest quality, no interest C C C
In default, in arrears DDD DDD
Questionable value DD DD
D D
Fitch and Standard & Poor's may use + or - to modify some ratings. Moody's uses the numerical
modifiers I (highest), 2, and 3 in the range from Aal through Ca3.
JOHN DowNEs & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVEsTMENT TERMS 353-54
(3d. ed. 1991).
The highest two grades (AAA and AA) are clearly investment grade. The next two highest grades
(A and BBB) are also investment grade in most contexts. However, some definitions of "investment
grade" include only the two (AAA and AA) or three (AAA, AA and A) highest grades. See, e.g.,
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-601.1(m) (1995) (highest two grades); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102c
(1993) (no specification beyond "investment grade"); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1402-1404 (McKinney 1985)
(for some purposes, only the two highest grades count; for other purposes, the three highest grades
count). The lower grades, from BB to D, are sometimes called "junk." DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra,
at 218.
The foregoing relates to ratings for "bonds". Securitization securities also take the form of
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highest rated debt is virtually certain, in the rating agency's estimation, to be
timely and fully repaid in accordance with its terms. The lowest rated debt is
significantly less likely to be timely and fully repaid. The highest several
grades of debt are "investment grade;" the remainder are "below investment
grade."4 Different classes of securities from one pool can have different
ratings; the same pool might have both highly rated and less highly rated
securities. If a pool has only one class of securities, that class will likely have
the highest or second highest rating the rating agencies give.4 ' If a pool has
multiple classes, the most senior class-that is, the class entitled to be paid
first-will likely receive the highest, or the second highest, rating.
The higher rated pool securities can be bought by entities who would be
constrained from buying lower rated securities. Many regulated entities such
as insurance companies42 and money market mutual funds43 may be restricted
from investing in securities rated below the higher investment grades. Entities
with investment discretion over others' funds, such as trustees of pension
funds, may be reluctant to invest in lower rated debt, fearing vulnerability to a
breach of fiduciary duty claim.'
Rating agencies dictate a significant amount of the structure of
securitization transactions. When the transactions were initially being
structured, the ratings agencies were heavily involved.45 Subsequently, they
"commercial paper," which are short-term obligations. The categories of ratings for commercial paper
are designated differently. For convenience my discussion speaks as though all ratings applicable to
securitization securities were the bond-style ratings.
40. See STRUCTURED FINANCING, supra note 1, at 275 (Moody's rating criteria for structured
financing); S&P CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 3-5. The rating does not address the likelihood that events
permitting less than full payment under the securities' terms (for instance, a particular movement of
interest rates) will occur. See Jordan & Schiavetta, supra note 33, at 44. A new type of rating, used in
some private placement transactions, addresses only the likelihood of full payment and not the
likelihood of timely payment. Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 540.
41. This statement, and the other general statements in this article concerning industry practice,
reflect numerous conversations I have had with lawyers, investment bankers, and rating agency
personnel specializing in securitization transactions.
42. Some statutes regulating insurance companies limit "riskier" investments, such as
investments below the highest investment grades. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1398 n.137;
see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-75-601.1(m) (1995) (highest two grades); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38q-
102c (1993) (investment grade only); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1402-1404 (McKinney 1985) (either top two
or three highest grades).
43. The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates mutual and money market funds. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 to -64 (1994). Rule 2a-7, promulgated under provisions of the Act, effectively prohibits
money market funds from investing in lower quality securities. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3) (1996).
44. See, e.g., Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), § 404(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
45. In the early 1980s, I was involved in the structuring of one of the earliest lease-backed
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issued very specific and detailed criteria for these transactions.46 And when a
securitization transaction with novel features is being considered, the rating
agencies are consulted at an early stage.
Rating agency criteria describe the required legal opinions regarding
important commercial and bankruptcy law issues.47 The criteria include very
specific eligibility standards for the entities that receive and distribute
payments to pool securities holders: these entities must have a specified
minimum capital and surplus, a minimum rating, and be subject to federal or
state regulatory supervision."
A transaction may include a guarantee49 of repayment of the pool
securities by a highly rated third party guarantor. The guarantee may qualify
the transaction for a higher rating. A transaction also may include
overcollateralization, in lieu of or in addition to third party insurance; indeed,
overcollateralization at a certain level may be required by the insurer.
Liquidity facilities-short term sources of funds-also may be needed if the
repayment patterns of the underlying receivables are less predictable.
Although rated transactions set the market standard; however, the terms of
unrated transactions generally are not significantly different from those of
rated transactions.5 °
receivables transactions. The rating agencies virtually dictated many aspects of the transaction
structure, and no significant aspect of the transaction was seriously considered without a consultation
with their representatives or counsel.
46. See, e.g., STRUCTURED FINANCING, supra note 1, at 275; S&P'S CRITERIA, supra note 1.
47. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
48. One typical provision setting forth eligibility criteria is as follows:
The Indenture Trustee shall be (a) a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the
United States of America or of any state thereof, (b) authorized under such laws to exercise
corporate trust powers, (c) have a combined capital and surplus of at least $50,000,000 (or whose
obligations hereunder are guaranteed by a bank or trust company authorized to exercise corporate
trust powers and subject to examination by Federal or state authority, of good standing and having
a combined capital and surplus aggregating at least such amount) and be subject to supervision or
examination by federal or state authorities, and (d) have (or have a parent which has) a long-term
unsecured debt rating of at least BBB- by Standard & Poor's and at least Baa3 by Moody's.
Indenture Between [Issuer] and State Street Bank and Trust Co., as Indenture Trustee § 6.11 (June 1,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Indenture).
49. Throughout this Article, I use the terms "guarantee" and "insurance" synonymously, and the
terms "guarantor" and "insurer" synonymously. My use of the terms also includes letters of credit
issued by banks in securitization transactions, because these essentially serve the same function as
insurance.
50. This article generally speaks as though all transactions were rated and insured. The direct
benefits rating and insurance provide are, of course, largely absent in transactions where rating and
insurance are absent. However, as discussed above and in Part IV.B.1, infra, the benefits of the rating
agency-developed standards and guidelines in unrated transactions are quite significant. Where
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Pool securities are almost always passive investments. Many investors
make no investigation or appraisal of the securities or the underlying
collateral, the receivables, beyond simply reviewing the offering documents.
Rather, ratings and a third party guarantee, (and perhaps overcollateralization)
often substitute for investor appraisal of the receivables. Investors need
consider only the terms of the pool securities, the rating, and the stature of the
guarantor. The transaction also does not require or contemplate that investors
take an active role in monitoring payments made on the receivables.51 The
transaction documentation provides for the mechanics of collecting
(servicing) the receivables, and payment of the amounts collected to the pool
securities holders.
Securitization's aim, often, is to package cash flow streams of receivables
into securities that are of high quality, as evidenced by a high rating, and
saleable on the capital markets. As discussed above, higher ratings require
relatively high assurance of (re)payment.52 Some firms' financial condition is
sufficiently precarious that no security they issue will be highly rated.
Securitization enables such a firm to issue, in effect, a highly rated security.
Securitization extracts from a lower rated firm some of its receivables; it
leaves behind the firm and its undesirable attributes. It then crafts the
receivables into securities, adding third-party appraisal(s), and credit
enhancement in the form of third party insurance and/or overcollateralization.
The securities thus issued command a higher rating, and hence a higher price,
than securities the firm could have issued directly. The higher price will be
passed along to the firm in the form of purchase price paid by the pool for the
receivables. The increase in price is greater than the associated costs;
otherwise, securitization would be zero-sum, or even negative sum.53
Securitization also packages cash flow streams or receivables into
securities that can be sold on the capital markets. Capital markets are the
"deepest" and most "liquid" of all financial markets, 4 offering the greatest
insurance is not obtained, the parties presumably are confident that the transaction's quality is
sufficiently high without it.
51. By contrast, in factoring transactions, factors appraise the receivables and compute the
purchase price accordingly. Factors also typically take an active role in assuring payment of the
receivables. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144; see infra Part IV.B.I.a.
52. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
54. I use the term "financial markets" to refer to what the academic literature typically refers to
as "capital markets." I do so in order to distinguish between markets on which claims having certain
characteristics are traded and markets on which claims not having such characteristics can be traded.
Financial markets are markets where all types of financing can be raised. Capital markets are a subset
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number of investors and transactions and often the lowest cost source of
financing. By comparison, other financial markets, such as the market where
bank loans are made, have fewer investors, fewer transactions, and often,
higher financing costs. Institutional investors often invest on both capital and
other financial markets; however, individual investors will most likely invest
on the capital markets and not on other financial markets. 5
To be saleable on the capital markets, securities must have characteristics
that permit liquidity. They must be comparatively cheap and easy to appraise,
buy, hold, and sell. Adequate appraisal must be possible from the "four
comers" of the offering documents. Purchases and sales also must be
comparatively easy: the security's general features, such as payment terms
and denominations, must be of more than idiosyncratic appeal, and the
transaction costs of purchasing and selling the security must be comparatively
low. In addition, an investor's ongoing responsibilities in connection with the
security must be limited. Hands-on monitoring of the security's issuer
generally will not be necessary. Securities sold on financial markets other
than capital markets may have some or all of these features; however,
securities sold on capital markets must have all of these features, or they will
not succeed (that is, find buyers) on the capital markets.
Receivables, by themselves, are not suitable capital markets securities.
They require extensive and costly appraisal and monitoring. Moreover, the
payment terms of particular receivables within a group can vary significantly,
making standardized interests difficult to fashion. Nonstandardized interests
might be of only limited appeal, and hence, difficult and costly to sell. Thus,
until securitization, sales of receivables would rarely, if ever, occur on capital
markets.
Securitization fashions a group of receivables into securities of sufficiently
general appeal to investors. As discussed above,56 the receivables are often
pre-appraised and insured. Monitoring of the payment flow servicing the pool
of financial markets, and include the stock market, the bond market and money markets, but do not
include markets on which banks loans are made or on which factors buy receivables. DOWNES &
GOODMAN, supra note 39, at 59.
55. My account presents the distinction between capital markets and other financial markets in a
somewhat stylized manner. Some noncapital market claims are very similar to some capital markets
claims. For instance, a privately placed security sold to one investor will often be very similar to a
bank loan. But whether one views the two markets as qualitatively different or merely part of a
continuum, the general notion is the same: the capital markets, or the capital markets part of the
financing continuum, is generally lower cost than the noncapital markets part. Securitization aids the
move from the higher cost market to the lower cost market.
56. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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securities (that is, the receivables) is provided for, and thus need not be a
primary concern of pool securities holders. Because the cash flows into the
pool can be crafted into pool securities that meet purchasers' needs, pool
securities can easily and cheaply be fashioned to have general appeal to many
purchasers, or specific appeal to a known purchaser. Securitization thus gives
a firm a new way to access the capital markets: the firm can create a security
by packaging together receivables with other items that enhance quality and
liquidity. This greater access is particularly valuable to firms which would
otherwise find the capital markets inhospitable, such as firms in poor financial
condition and smaller firms." Capital markets are also less hospitable to
lower-quality securities-indeed, such securities are likely to find fewer ready
buyers. Thus, for firms whose alternatives are lower quality securities,
wherever sold, or other financial markets, securitization is likely to be
particularly valuable.
More generally, securitization can package cash flow streams for sale
either to a new group of investors, or for a higher price, or both. For instance,
securitization has packaged cash flow streams of firms outside the United
States for sale to United States capital or noncapital markets investors, who
were willing to pay more than the firms' domestic investors.58 And there may
be temporary market "mispricings" among various types of securities, such
that one type (securitization securities, for instance) is overvalued relative to
others.59
Securitization transactions often involve large dollar amounts; a
transaction involving several hundred million dollars is not unusual.6' As
57. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 151-52. The size constraint likely reflects the limited
trading volume for smaller firms. I use the term "smaller firm" to refer to firms having less than $300
million in gross revenues. The rewards for producing the kind of information capital markets would
require might be insufficient. This problem may be more self-perpetuating than it at first seems. Small,
less established firms may be less constrained by reputation, and thus, markets might require much
more information about them than otherwise comparable firms that are larger and more established.
58. See, e.g., Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 1.07 (loans to exporters from an African
Bank); Dean Foust et al., Financing World Growth, Bus. WK., Oct. 3, 1994, at 100 (Aeromexico's
ticket receivables).
59. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 143. Indeed, this is presumably one reason why chief
financial officers responding to a poll taken by the Institutional Investor often cited "diversifying
funding sources" as one of the main reasons their firms would do a securitization transaction. See
Securitization Hesitation, INSTITUTrONAL INVESTOR, June 1994, at 241; see also infra notes 203-07
and accompanying text.
60. Minimum effective transaction size is shrinking as the costs of securitization decline.
Minimum effective transaction size for a private transaction may now be $25 million, and should
shrink further. Martin Essenburg, Securitizing Receivables: When This Financing Fits, CORP.
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stated in the Introduction, securitization transactions presently represent a
large dollar volume of financing, and will likely continue to represent a
significant volume in the future. Present issuers will likely continue and,
perhaps, expand their securitization activities, new issuers will join the
market, and new types of receivables will be securitized. As discussed in Part
IV.C, present issuers include banks, finance companies, and many types of
commercial businesses. Some issuers are large, some are small, some are
highly rated, and some are not"
Mortgages began the securitization boom, and a significant amount of the
volume of securitizations is still in mortgages.62 The first mortgage
securitization transactions were done by issuers sponsored by the U.S.
Government, and these issuers are still responsible for most mortgage
transactions outstanding.63 The aggregate value of all mortgage-backed
securities outstanding as of December 31, 1994 was more than $1.7 trillion
dollars.' After mortgages, the most common receivables securitized are
credit card receivables (more than $94 billion outstanding as of December 31,
1994)6' and auto loans (more than $35 billion outstanding as of December 31,
1994).66 Recently, mortgage securitizations have declined significantly, and
non-mortgage securitizations, particularly credit card securitizations, have
increased.67
Other receivables that have been securitized include: lease receivables
(including automobile, equipment, and aircraft leases), trade receivables,
commercial loans, defaulting loans,68 boat loans, loans to low-quality
borrowers, loans to small businesses, insurance premiums, export credits,
franchise fees, airline ticket receivables, toll road receivables, health care
CASHFLOWMAG., Mar. 1, 1995, at 30, available in 1995 WL 10011120.
61. See infra Part lV.C.
62. See infra Appendix A.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Pratt, supra note 4; Raghavan, supra note 4; Strom, supra note 4; see also Rupert
Chisholm, New Issuers, Refinancing to Spur Record Year for Credit Receivables, ASSET SALES REP.,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 1; Perlmuth, supra note 26.
68. Securitizations of defaulting loans tend, unsurprisingly, to be very overcollateralized. The
principal amount of defaulting loans in a pool might be several times the principal amount of the
senior securities sold by the pool. See, e.g., Steven Davidson, Rating the B&C Secondary Market: B
and C Mortgage-Backed Securities, AM. COMMUNITY BANKER, Aug. 1995, at 38 (noting that
Moody's typically requires twice the collateral for B and C rated loans than for pools with A rated
loans).
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receivables, nursing home receivables, mortgage servicing rights, rights to
royalties, and tax receivables.69 These transactions represent a small, but
increasing, percentage of securitization transactions. 0
To date, the securitization structure generally has fared well, surviving
legal challenges largely intact.71 Pool securities generally have yielded their
promised returns, with investors receiving what they bargained for.72 But
investors purchasing some of the more exotic pool securities found that their
"bargain" included outcomes-losses-they had not expected.'
III. COSTS: STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN SECURITIZATION
TRANSACTIONS
As Appendix B illustrates, securitization involves considerable
complexity. Securitization involves: (1) selection ("pooling") of the
receivables to be conveyed; (2) creation of the entity (the "pool") to which the
receivables will be conveyed; (3) establishment of the terms of the securities
to be issued by the pool;74 (4) conveyance of the receivables; (5) issuance of
the pool securities; (6) establishment of mechanisms by which the receivables
69. See Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, at xxi; FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 2.4.4; Henry A.
Fernandez, Globalization of Mortgage Backed Securities, 1987 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 357; Leebron,
supra note 7, at 179; Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
137, 137-41; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1380; Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 532;
Kirk Cypel, Comment. Federal Assignment-Backed Securities (Fast Backs): Financing Federal
Accounts Receivable Through Securitization, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1994); Gregory R. Salath6,
Note, Reducing Health Care Costs Through Hospital Accounts Receivable Securitization, 80 VA. L.
REV. 549 (1994); M. Cathy Anderson Coleman, The Tricky Business of Securitizing Business Loans,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1994, at 74; Ginnie-Freddie Giant MBS, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws,
Aug. 1, 1994, at 1; Look for Securitized Servicing, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 20; RTC
Set to Restart Securitization Program this Summer, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 25;
Securities Market Sees B, C, Growth, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 11, 1994, at 45; Structured
Finance "Rehabilitates Dicey Deals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1993, at 1. International and foreign
securitizations are for the most part beyond the scope of this Article.
70. See infra Appendix A.
71. See, e.g., Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 565.
72. See id. at 539, 567.
73. See infra note 133.
74. Some pool securities simply "pass through" amounts paid on the receivables rather than
crafting new cash flows payable from those amounts. An example of a pass-through security is one
entitling the holder to payments on the underlying pool receivables when received by the pool. Other
pool securities, which may be called "pay-through" securities, entitle the holder to payments on a
specified schedule. The schedule would likely resemble, but probably not duplicate, the schedule of
payments on the underlying receivables. The only difference for purposes of my analysis is that the
passed-through cash flows do not involve the crafting costs or benefits. I treat all securitizations as
though they involved crafted cash flows, because noncrafted cash flows is the easier special case.
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will be serviced (collected), and the amounts collected held until payment to
the pool's securities holders; and (7) often, the issuance of the rating agency's
rating and the insurer's guaranty.
Each of the many players involved in a securitization transaction adds
additional complexities. Each player will impose terms and conditions on its
participation, including terms and conditions relating to the financial
condition and good conduct of the others.
The many statutes, regulations, and caselaw precedents involved in
obtaining the desired legal and regulatory treatment must be identified and
complied with." One matter of paramount concern is that the conveyance of
the receivables be respected. The conveyance of the receivables might not be
respected in a seller bankruptcy. For instance, a bankruptcy court might: (i)
recharacterize the transaction as a secured borrowing rather than a "true
sale;"76 (ii) characterize the transfer of the receivables from the seller to the
pool as a "fraudulent transfer" or "fraudulent conveyance;"" or (iii)
75. My discussion is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; thus, I do not give full
consideration to all applicable statutes and regulations.
76. The leading case on what constitutes a "true sale" is Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle
Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that intent of the parties and structure of the
transaction determines whether a transfer of receivables is a sale or secured loan). However, it should
be noted that Major's Furniture Mart is not a bankruptcy case. Rather, it arose under § 9-502 of the
Uniform Commercial Code concerning rights to surplus. Id. at 502. Article 9 applies to all transfers of
receivables. U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (1995). However, there are different default rules depending upon
whether a transfer of receivables is a sale or a secured loan. U.C.C. § 9-502(b) (1995). Given
contractual silence, the Major's Furniture Mart court needed to determine whether the transaction was
a sale or secured loan to determine which default rule to apply. 602 F.2d at 542-43. The bankruptcy
analysis of securitizations treats Major's Furniture Mart as the seminal case on "true sales" for
bankruptcy purposes. See generally Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 527; Thomas E. Plank,
Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper Under the U.C.C. and the
Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV. 397, 471-72 & n.312 (1994).
But see Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that regardless of the
intent of the parties or the structure of the transaction, a transfer of accounts receivable will be viewed
as a secured financing, rather than a sale). The holding in Octagon Gas has been widely criticized and,
to date, has not been adopted by any other circuit. For a general discussion of "true sales," see Borod,
SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 7.06, and Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 542, 544 n.49.
Schwarcz notes that for higher quality firms, bankruptcy is less of a concern, and there may be less of a
need to structure the transaction as a "true sale" for bankruptcy purposes. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra
note 1, at 142.
77. Both federal bankruptcy law and state insolvency laws have "fraudulent transfer" or
"fraudulent conveyance" statutes. Under these statutes, certain transfers which occur while the
transferor's financial condition is precarious, or which cause the transferor's financial condition to
become precarious, may be voided. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270-
281 (McKinney 1990). To be voidable under these statutes, a transfer need not involve actual fraud;
constructive fraud will suffice. Moreover, the transferor's receipt of less than sufficient consideration
in the transaction may suffice to show constructive fraud. See DAVID. G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
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"substantively consolidate" the pool with the seller.78 If any of these occur,
the payment stream from the pool to the pool securities holders (that is,
payments on the pool securities) could be interrupted, thus undermining the
basic premise of the securitization transaction that securitization investors'
fortunes do not depend on the financial condition of the seller.7 9
Compounding the problem, the conveyance will most likely be challenged
precisely when the seller's financial condition is deteriorating and the
deleterious effects on investors are most pronounced."0
Avoiding the possibility of recharacterization of the transaction as a
secured borrowing"1 adds additional complexities. There is no surefire ways
to avoid the possibility of such recharacterization82 consistent with the parties'
other aims. Some of the features which might support a recharacterization 3
are considered desirable, and are therefore present in many securitization
transactions.84 For example, transactions involving debt are often structured
as borrowings for tax purposes. The seller often continues to service the
receivables, and notice of the transfer usually is not given to the receivables'
obligors. Also, there may be some recourse to the seller if the receivables are
defective. 5
Avoiding secured borrowing treatment is often critical for reasons other
than bankruptcy. Securitization transactions typically need to pass muster as
BANKRUPTCY §§ 6-46 to -47 (1992).
78. Substantive consolidation involves treating the assets and liabilities of separate legal entities
as though they belonged to a single entity. In a bankruptcy proceeding, the creditors of an insolvent
entity might attempt to reach the assets of a related solvent entity by arguing that the two entities
should be substantively consolidated. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 79, § 2-4.
79. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 256.
80. Even if the conveyance were respected, the seller's bankruptcy during the transaction term
would likely have other adverse effects on the transaction parties. For instance, if the seller's financial
condition deteriorates during the transaction term and, as is common, the seller is also the servicer of
the receivables, the flow into the pool of receivables payments might be interrupted, thereby
interrupting payments to the pool securities holders. Moreover, an ailing seller in an end-game might
be more likely to behave opportunistically by, for instance, not turning over the servicing receipts in a
timely fashion.
81. For a general discussion of the differences between a secured borrowing transaction and a
securitization transaction, see FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 1.1.
82. Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 1, at 145.
83. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 545 n.12 (3d Cir.
1979) (nature and extent of recourse given to transferor); In re Mid Atlantic Fund, Inc., 60 Bankr. 604
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (administration and collection of accounts).
84. See Schwarcz, Divisible Interests, supra note 1, at 145-49; Financing Techniques, supra note
1, at 543-47.
85. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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sales for accounting purposes.86 While accounting standards differ from
bankruptcy standards, there is a significant overlap. Applicable accounting
standards deny "sales" characterization to transactions in which the seller
guarantees that all, or some portion, of the receivables will be successfully
collected. A representation by the seller that the receivables will be collected
would constitute a guarantee for this purpose; thus, representations in
securitization transactions may address the "character" of receivables (that is,
no impediments to collectibility) but not their "performance" (that is, actual
collection). Moreover, an overly expansive seller guarantee of the receivables
would cast doubt on whether the transaction was a "true sale" for bankruptcy
purposes.88 In sum, selling a right to receive money (receivables) while
retaining the risk that the receivables will not be collected (whether by
guaranteeing performance or by some other means) is essentially equivalent
to borrowing money secured by the receivables. The purchaser in such a
transaction is not acquiring the risks of ownership but rather, advancing funds
86. FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 7.14.1; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1416. The benefit of
accounting sales treatment is typically presumed without explanation. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra
note 1, at 142-43; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1395-96. Indeed the explanation is not obvious,
except insofar as accounting standards somehow trigger some legal or regulatory consequence. For
financial institutions, the consequence is clear. See infra Appendix D, § 2. For other firms, it is oflen
less clear. One quasi-regulatory benefit, however, involves rating agencies. In rating firms, the
agencies apply capital adequacy standards not dissimilar to those applied by regulators of financial
institutions. Different rating agencies have different standards as to how securitization transactions
reduce the capital maintenance requirements applicable for a particular firm. See Davidson, supra note
68, at 38 (discussing rating criteria). Some agencies permit far greater reductions on the basis of capital
requirements than others. For instance, Fitch has developed models to more precisely measure the
effect securitization should have on a firm's risk profile. See Fitch Unveils New CBO/CLO Rating
Criteria, CORP. FINANCING WK., Apr. 22, 1996, at 6 (discussing Fitch's rating methodology).
Supported by this model, Fitch allows firms using securitization to retain less capital than do some
other rating agencies, yet still obtain high debt ratings. In any event, all rating agencies consider
accounting sales treatment a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to permitting any reductions.
Again, why rating agencies would permit capital reductions based on an accounting treatment is not
clear.
More likely, the accounting sales treatment is valued as an assessment by experts that the firm has
become less risky. The treatment itself, then, is not what is valued, rather, the value lies in the
information it conveys. The accountants are making a (perhaps somewhat arbitrary) demarcation along
the continuum between a sale and a borrowing,.and others, such as lenders, defer to the accountants'
expertise. I discuss the benefits of particular accounting treatments at length in Claire A. Hill, Why
Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Other Financial
Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 1997).
87. FAS 77, supra note 35, § 5. RAP is similar but more emphatic than GAAP on the issue of
guarantees; RAP might deny sales treatment for transactions that would pass muster under FAS 77.
Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 2.03.C; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1416-18; see
supra notes 34-36.
88. Seesupra note 76.
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in anticipation of later payment of the receivables.
Representations as to the receivables' quality are less important in the
closest alternatives to securitization, secured loans and factoring transactions.
In a secured loan, such performance representations would not be precluded.
Furthermore, because the loan terms would likely provide the lenders access
to the borrower's other assets, availability of such representations would be of
less concern. By contrast, if the transaction was a factoring transaction,
performance representations also would not be possible; factoring
transactions also seek accounting sales treatment. But factors are well situated
to make their own investigation of the receivables' quality.89 Investors in
securitization transactions, however, are specialized in investing generally but
not in acquiring assets which require appraisal and monitoring, such as
receivables. Thus, factors have far less need for the comfort performance
representations would provide than do securitization investors. Furthermore,
factors pay significantly less than face value for receivables:? this discount,
which is functionally equivalent to a higher interest rate, helps compensate
the factor for the absence of performance representations.
Securitization, by contrast, is structured so that investors pay an amount
closer to face value for receivables. Since securitization investors can neither
obtain performance representations nor make an adequate investigation, they
require alternate and costly means to assure the quality of the receivables. As
discussed in Part II, these assurances typically include all or some
combination of a rating, a guaranty, a liquidity facility, and
overcollateralization. 9
Securitization transactions also require attention to many other legal and
regulatory considerations. There are federal and state securities law issues,92
as there would be for any financing transaction. But these issues are more
complicated than those raised in simpler transaction structures. The extra
entity may itself create an extra layer of regulation and disclosure. While
there are exemptions from some federal and state securities law
requirements,93 especially those involving filing and disclosure, the
89. See BISCOE, supra note 23, at 39-63 (describing information typically acquired by a factor).
90. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144-45; see also infra Part IV.B.I.a.
91. See supra notes 46-5 1 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
93. See Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 5.01. Securities to be offered must be registered
under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994), or qualify for an exemption.
Exemptions which might be available for offerings of pool securities include: § (3)(a)(2), 15 U.S.C
§ 77c(a)(2) (1994) (securities issued or guaranteed by governmental authorities); § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.
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transaction must be carefully structured to ensure the exemptions'
availability.
Securitization transactions raise issues under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 ("1940 Act").9 4 The 1940 Act regulates companies whose assets are
principally securities.95 Pools consisting of receivables fit within the statutory
definition of investment company,96 and are potentially subject to regulation
under the 1940 Act. Compliance with the 1940 Act is sufficiently costly that
virtually all securitization transactions are structured to meet one of the
exemptions;97 this endeavor also is costly.
Tax statutes and regulations present other important considerations.
Parties typically want the transaction to be treated as a borrowing for tax
purposes. Such treatment should avoid entity-level taxation of the pool,
permit the seller to deduct interest payments made on pool securities which
are structured as debt, and prevent the recognition of gain (or loss) on the
conveyance of receivables to the pool.9" Tax statutes and regulations specify
conditions that must be met for a transaction to be treated as a borrowing for
§ 77c(a)(5) (1994), (securities issued by savings and loan associations); §4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1994), (private placements); and § 4(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(5) (1994), (certain mortgages). See Borod,
SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 5.03.C.1, .C.3, .D.1-.2; see also infra Appendix D, § 1.
Outstanding securities are often subject to the registration and periodic disclosure requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. An exemption which might be available for pool securities is
§ 15(a) & Rule 3a 12-4 (excluding certain mortgage-backed securities). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4), (5),
(12)(i), 78o(a)(1) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a 12-4 (1996); FRANKEL, supra note 1, §§ 13.4.3, .6.
State securities laws also impose registration and disclosure requirements. The Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement preempts these requirements for private mortgage-backed securities.
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, § 106(c), 98 Stat. 1689,
1692 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-l(c) (1994)); Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1385-86 & n.78.
These securities can receive the same exemptions available to government agency sponsored
mortgage-backed securities.
Investment Company Act of 1940 exemptions typically used in securitization transactions are set
forth in infra note 97.
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1988).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, -3 (1994).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a), -2(a)(36) (1994).
97. See Borod, SECURtTIZATION, supra note 1, at § 5.05.A; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at
1413 n.231. Typical exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940 used in securitization
transactions include the "private investment company" exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)
(1994) for issuers who do not make a public offerings and whose securities are held by no more than
100 persons; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1994) for issuers who are banks or insurance companies; 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C) (1994) for issuers who are primarily engaged in acquiring mortgages and liens
on real estate; and Rule 3a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1996) for issuers of asset-backed securities. Borod,
SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 5.05.C.
98. Most pool securities are structured as debt for tax purposes, but some are structured as equity.
See FRANKEL, supra note 1, §§ 8.10-.12.
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tax purposes; 9 these must be taken into account in structuring the transaction.
And if a pool wishes to issue certain complex mortgage-backed securities, it
can avoid federal entity-level taxation only by qualifying as a Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC").1t°
Matters specific to the seller of the receivables must be considered.''
There may be particular accounting rules, for instance, which govern "sales"
treatment for particular types of sellers. For example, financial institutions
have accounting requirements that must be met to assure the desired treatment
of the transaction.10
2
Matters specific to the types of receivables involved also must be
considered. Often, pool receivables are themselves secured. For instance,
typical receivables in securitization transactions are mortgages and auto
loans. ' 3 These receivables are secured by, respectively, particular real estate
and automobiles. The purchasers of pool securities will want, in addition to
the right to the receivables, a right to foreclose on the underlying collateral."°
For example, in a mortgage securitization transaction, the pool securities
holders will want the ability to foreclose on the real properties owned by
defaulting mortgagors.'I5
And of course, transaction costs must be considered. Standard
securitization transactions involve the smallest costs because they are
sufficiently alike that an investment in structuring or understanding one
transaction can be amortized over many."° Less standard transactions are
considerably more costly."07
99. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 671 (1954); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-3(a)(1), 301-7701-4(c) (as amended in
1969); see also Borod, SECURriZATION, supra note 1, §§ 4.02.A, .C.l, .03.B.1, .C.2.
100. See generally Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, §§ 1.04.C, 4.04.A-.B. Legislation which
would provide a simple means to avoid entity-level taxation in securitization transactions other than
mortgage securitization transactions has recently been proposed. See, e.g., H.R. 1967, 104th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1995).
101. See Shenker & Colletta. supra note 1, at 1407 n.191.
102. See Borod, SECUR1TIZATION, supra note 1, §§ 2.03(c), 2.04; see also supra notes 35-36.
103. See infra Appendix A.
104. See infra Part IV.C.
105. Also, there will likely be state law requirements regarding matters such as transfer of the
rights of the secured parties. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 7.23.5.3.
106. The legal, accounting, and rating agency costs of securitization can be significant; however,
the bulk of these expenses are incurred in the first transaction of a securities program. Martin D.
Essenburg, Considering Securitization? Look Beyond Cost, CORP. CASHFLOW MAG., Mar. 1995, at 32.
For the more standard types of transactions, once a securitization program is established, costs for
subsequent transactions using the program's template are generally competitive with, or lower than,
the costs associated with other types of financing. Id.
107. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144-45; see also Monolines, supra note 26, at 6.
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IV. BENEFITS: WHY ARE SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS DONE?
The foregoing has considered the complexities and costs of securitization
transactions. I next consider what offsetting benefits securitization might
offer.0
8
A. The Modigliani and Miller Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem
Like other financing transactions, securitization affects a firm's capital
structure.10 9 Modigliani and Miller's famous irrelevance theorem holds that
capital structure does not affect firm value: a firm cannot increase its value by
having one capital structure rather than another."' 0 But clearly, firms spend
enormous time, energy and expense choosing among, and sometimes
developing, different capital structures. This behavior can be seen as rational
only in a world where the theorem's underlying assumptions are violated, and
the theorem therefore does not hold.
The Modigliani and Miller assumptions can be stated as follows:
(1) Financing decisions are independent of investment decisions,
broadly construed: a firm's capital structure decision will not affect its
future receipts and expenditures (cash flows).1  Agency, regulatory,
and other costs affect a firm's future cash flows; financing decision
independence means that there are no such costs which a firm's capital
structure can affect.
(2) Financial markets are perfect. For my purposes, this means
they are strong-form efficient," 2 with all participants costlessly having,
and correctly assessing, all available information. This also means that
there are no transaction costs to issue, buy, or sell.
108. This article does not generally address the third-party effects of a firm's use of securitization.
Some of these effects are positive; some are negative. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 1, §§ 3.1-
5.11.6. For a discussion of some third-party effects, see infra notes 121, 154, 196, and Appendix D,
§1.
109. A firm raising money in a securitization transaction generally will have more equity and less
debt (for accounting purposes) than an otherwise comparable firm raising money using secured (or
unsecured) borrowing.
110. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 8.
111. For this purpose, a firm's expenditures do not include the dividend or interest payments it
would pay if all the Modigliani and Miller assumptions were true.
112. See generally RONALD J. GiLsON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 135-45 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the different forms of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis).
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(3) Financial markets are complete. For my purposes, this means
principally that perfect substitutes for everything are available.
(4) Financial markets do not discriminate between those seeking
financing and those providing financing: each has the same
opportunities available to them on the same terms.' 13
The first assumption, coupled with the traditional finance principle that a
firm's value is the net present value of its expected future cash flows, implies
that there is only one correct value for a firm, regardless of its capital
structure. The remainder of the assumptions imply that a price difference
between two equally valuable firms (or cash flow streams) should not persist
as it would be arbitraged away. And it is not only differences between equally
valuable firms or cash flow streams that will be arbitraged away. Each firm
(and cash flow stream) has a correct price; if perfect arbitrage is possible, it
also will assure that the relationship between the price of any two firms or
cash flow streams is correct.
The world of Modigliani and Miller's theorem is, of course, not our world.
In our world, there are many costs, including information costs, agency costs,
regulatory costs, and transaction costs. And there are benefits which particular
capital structures can provide.
B. How Might a Firm Benefit from Using Securitization?
Generally, a securitization security can command a higher price either
because of its higher quality, greater access to financing sources ("liquidity"),
or both. Unsurprisingly, higher quality securities command higher prices than
lower quality securities. And more liquid securities-that is, securities more
cheaply and readily saleable to more investors-command higher prices than
less liquid securities.
Quality and liquidity are related. A security will only be liquid if its
quality is readily known; similarly, a security will only command the "high
quality" price if its quality is readily known to be high. Thus, there is
significant overlap between what must be done to make a security high
quality, and what must be done to make it liquid.
113. Statements of the assumptions include Modigliani & Miller, supra note 8; Buckley, supra
note 10, at 1397 n.9; and Eugene F. Fama, The Effects of a Firm's Investment and Financing
Decisions, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 272 (1978).
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Securitization, its proponents claim,' 4 offers a better-cheaper-way of
achieving higher quality and liquidity. Implicit in this claim is that higher
quality is achieved without a commensurate decrease in the quality of the
remainder of the firm. Securitization must, somehow, make the sum of the
firm's more and less valuable parts greater than the whole. 5
I now explore the cost reductions and other benefits securitization could
offer. I first consider benefits which contribute both to higher quality and to
liquidity.
1. Securitization May Reduce Financiers 'Information Costs
Finns engaging in financing transactions, like firms engaging in most any
transaction, suffer from the well-known "lemons" problem." 6 The borrower
(in this case, the seller of the receivables) knows more about the firm than the
lender (in this case, the buyer of pool securities) does, and has an incentive to
exaggerate the firm's quality. The lender knows this, and offers the borrower
only a "lemons" price based on her worst-case estimate. The borrower can get
the lender to offer more only if the borrower can convince the lender that the
borrower is not a "lemon." Some firms have more severe lemons problems
than others: The financial community-that is, the community of prospective
financiers-has insufficient information to appraise such firms' prospects or
their potential liabilities, and cannot learn more without incurring
considerable expense.
Of course, implicit in the lemons problem is a violation of the Modigliani
and Miller assumption of complete and costless access to information.
Securitization may offer a lower cost solution to the lemons problem. The
subject matter of the conveyance consists of securities backed by receivables.
Thus, information is needed both about the securities and the receivables.
And, as discussed in Part HI, information is also needed about the firm selling
the receivables. 7 Securitization offers a low cost, credible way for such
information to be produced and provided to investors."'
114. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
115. Benston has difficulty seeing how securitization makes the parts worth more than the whole.
He also notes that given securitization's costliness, it would have to offer a large increment of value to
avoid being negative-sum. See Benston, supra note 1, at 76; see also Leebron, supra note 7, at 178.
116. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text
118. The discussion in Part IV.B.I applies less to private placement transactions. The investors in
such transactions are more sophisticated, and better situated to make their own appraisals of the
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a. Information About a Firm's Receivables
Securitization may help firms learn and demonstrate more easily that their
receivables are not "lemons." Securitization permits economies of scale and
scope in the acquisition and dissemination of information about a firm's
receivables." 9 Firms, knowing they will be securitizing their receivables, can
work with specialist appraisers (rating agencies and insurers) to develop
receivables that are more easily appraised. Prospectively, receivables can be
standardized, as to terms, documentation, and underwriting criteria.'
For some receivables, this process is comparatively easy.' For others, it
is quite difficult.' And for some receivables, the difficulties may be such that
receivables, the securities, and the firm. Moreover, these transactions may not involve rating agencies
and insurers, or if they do, the rating agencies and insurers may be serving a regulatory function rather
than an informational function. See supra notes 38, 42-44 and accompanying text. Thus, the sales price
for securities in private placement transactions tends to be lower than the price for comparable
securities in transactions open to less sophisticated investors.
119. See infra Part W.B.I.b.
120. Benston notes some of the "costs" of loan standardization: Borrowers with less
standardizable financing needs will have to pay a premium for loans tailored for their needs and
borrowers who desire flexibility during the loan term also will have to pay more. Benston, supra note
1, at 75; see also Borod, SECURiTIZATION, supra note 1. § 1.03.B.3. Litan points out that by making
standardization of loans more profitable, securitization has made the traditional banking business of
making and holding nonstandardized loans, much less profitable. LITAN, supra note 4, at 15; see also
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller. Bank Failure: The Politicization of a Social Problem, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 289 (1992).
121. One example is mortgages securitized by the government sponsored entities ("GSEs"),
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. The mortgages were not difficult to securitize. The GSEs
were able to dictate standardized terms, documentation, and underwriting criteria. Because mortgages
to "A" borrowers are familiar types of instruments, payment patterns have been comparatively easy to
predict, and cash flows for pool securities were easy to craft. See infra Appendix D, § 1.
122. Mortgages other than those securitized by the GSEs were much more difficult to securitize.
These mortgages were, overall, less familiar instruments because payment patterns were less familiar,
and terms, documentation, and underwriting criteria were far less standardized. Another now
commonly securitized receivable, credit card receivables, also was initially difficult to securitize.
These receivables had payment patterns that were difficult to craft into pool securities. The patterns
bore little resemblance to a payment schedule pool securities purchasers investors would have found
desirable. Underwriting criteria, too, varies significantly among credit card issuers. However, the
problems in securitizing these receivables have been surmounted, and they are now among the most
commonly securitized receivables. See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
In the case of commercial mortgages, the work was done by the Resolution Trust Company-its
need to dispose of a very large portfolio of such loans (approximately $50 billion) made the work
worthwhile. William Seidman, then-chairman of the Resolution Trust Company (and former chairman
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) estimated that disposing of the RTC's portfolio at the
rate of $1 million every day would take 120 years. See Sally R. Bourrie, R.LP. RTC: After Five
Controversial Years and Enough Bad Ink to Sink an Ocean Liner, Denver's RTC Office Fades Quietly
Away, COLO. BUS., Mar. 1, 1995, at 48. Instead, using securitization, the RTC was able to dispose of
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securitization simply is not worthwhile.'3
Appraisal techniques have been developed by rating agencies in tandem
with the development of the securitization transaction structure. 4 The
techniques exploit particular features of the transaction, such as the size and
composition of the pool. As discussed in the next subpart, securitization
permits capital markets investors, who are in fairly large supply, to acquire
interests in receivables; thus, the pools of receivables to be financed can be
quite large. And securitization's large pool sizes permit careful pool
composition. For example, receivables can be selected for geographic and
other types of diversity. If a single firm does not have sufficient receivables to
achieve the desired pool composition, a multi-seller pool can be formed.
By contrast, factoring is a far more active and specialized pursuit; 25 thus,
the volume of factor financing available is likely to be far smaller.2 6 With a
smaller transaction volume, development of the securitization-inspired
techniques might not have been worthwhile. Factoring transactions can make
use of such techniques, but the techniques are most profitably used in
transactions of greater volume, such as securitization transactions. 2
Credit enhancement techniques, such as insurance and
overcollateralization, also operate to reduce information costs about
receivables. Insurers "piggyback" on rating agencies' appraisals.' Rating
nearly $40 billion of its portfolio in less than 4 years. More recently, RTC issuances have declined as it
liquidates, and private issuances have increased. Id.; see also infra Appendix D, § 1.
123. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144-45. For example, one type of receivable that has
not been securitized is health care receivables due from individual payors (in instances in which
neither third-party nor government insurance is available). Sunasir Sen & James P. Lawler,
Securitizing Receivables Offers Low-Cost Financing Option, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 1995, at
32. Another type of receivable that has not been securitized is professional firm receivables (that is,
receivables of law or accounting firms or investment banks). Such receivables would be very difficult
to standardize. Moreover, both the payors and payees might want confidentiality as to the amount of
the receivable or even the existence of the relationship. Finally, both would likely want flexibility to
negotiate deviations from the stated terms of the obligations without third party involvement.
124. See S&P'S CRITERIA, supra note 1; STRUCTURED FINANCING, supra note 1, at 275. Even in
transactions where rating agencies are not involved, their techniques and standards are nevertheless
employed. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144.
126. The common understanding that capital markets offer increased access to capital suggests
that this must be the case.
127. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 144-46.
128. Indeed, according to lawyers specializing in these transactions, some insurers require the
rating agencies to state that a transaction would have received an investment grade rating even without
insurance. The insurer is willing to add three ratings grades, but not more-that is, it is willing to
enhance a "BBB" transaction to the level of "AAA", but it is not willing to enhance a "BB" transaction
to "AAA!'
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agencies and insurers have both specialized skills in appraising receivables129
and strong stakes in performing diligently and honestly. The rating agency's
main asset is its reputation; because rating is a highly public activity, an ill-
considered rating will likely inflict serious damage. The insurer, of course,
could suffer both reputational and immediate monetary damage. 30
Insurers "piggyback" as well on the firm's promise to make the insurers
whole for any losses in connection with the transaction. The firm not only has
a considerable reputational and financial stake in good performance, but also
the most information of any party as to the quality of the receivables. Better
and cheaper appraisal should lead to cheaper third-party insurance, since the
appraisal includes much of the information necessary to price the risk to be
insured.
The firm also provides additional "insurance' and signals the receivables'
quality with representations, and sometimes, overcollateralization of the
transaction. The signal is particularly strong if, as is sometimes the case, the
residual rights in the pool-whatever is left of the overcollateralization after
the senior pool securities have been paid-are retained by the firm. 3' And the
signal's credibility is enhanced by reputational constraints: unless a firm is in
an "end-game,"' 32 it likely wants to preserve its reputation in the financial
markets. The small size of the securitization community suggests that
misbehavior likely will be discovered.
129. Transactions without a rating agency or insurer, or both, are likely to involve more
sophisticated investors who are willing, and presumably able, to perform their own appraisals. Some
transactions, regardless of whether a rating agency or insurer are involved, require investor appraisal,
not so much of the quality of receivables (that is, whether they will be paid according to their terms)
but of the terms themselves. One example is commercial mortgage-backed securities. For this reason,
the investors willing to purchase such securities have been banks and other institutions with
considerable experience with commercial mortgages. The prices of such securities, consequently, has
been relatively low. However, as more of these mortgages are securitized, the process of disclosing
information has become more standardized. More investors are becoming comfortable making these
investments, and the prices of the securities are rising. See A New Breed of Bond, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Mar. 1995, at 69.
130. Insurers increasingly are taking a more active role in designing securitization transactions, as
their premiums from insuring the more standard types of transactions decline in a competitive market.
Presumably, the transactions they help design are those in which they have expertise in appraising and
bearing the risks involved. See Monolines, supra note 26.
131. To obtain the desired regulatory treatment, the selling firm may be required to sell this
interest, which is sometimes called the B piece. See supra note 36. Rating agencies will not rate highly
pool securities in a transaction where the B piece is exceptionally large; they probably believe the firm
is signalling a problem with the transaction or the receivables.
132. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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b. Information About a Firm and Its Securities
I argued above that a firm's receivables are most cheaply appraised in
bulk as part of an assembly line process designed for use in securitization
transactions. That process crafts, from a firm's receivables, securities with
different terms designed to appeal more to investors. In appraising these
securities, investors appraise both the securities' terms and source of
(re)payment
Many investors do not make an independent appraisal of the source of
(re)payment, the receivables, relying instead upon the appraisal made by the
rating agency and insurer. This seems appropriate because many
securitization investors are not well-situated to appraise the quality of
receivables. Specialized, and often hands-on, skills are required, and the
rating agency and insurer have, and are well-known to have, such skills.
By contrast, investors are far better situated to appraise the terms of a
firm's securities. They can understand the pool securities' terms, and apply
"armchair" financial models to evaluate what the expected payouts will be
under various different scenarios, using skills they have developed and used
in the context of their other investments. And different investors may be
better at appraising different types of pool securities. For instance, some
investors may be better at appraising more senior risks of receivables pools,
whereas others may be better at appraising residual risks of those same
pools.'
More generally, aggregate information costs of a firm's financiers may be
133. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 143. Some such "specialists" may be prepared to
relinquish the designation. They were purchasers of exotic interests, including residual interests, in
certain pools of mortgages. These interests, dubbed "toxic waste" on Wall Street, proved to be
disastrous investments. Some of the "specialists" who bought these interests later claimed not to have
understood the terms. Among those suffering significant losses from such interests were Lew Ranieri,
"a founding father of mortgage-backed securities market." See Michael Carroll & Alyssa A. Lappen,
Mortgage-Backed Mayhem, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1994, at 81. A large mutual fund, run by
David Askin, with $600 million under management, became insolvent largely from investing in these
interests. Id. Since the collapse of Mr. Askin's fund, he has been hired as a lecturer at Columbia
Business School to teach a course called "Debt Markets". Jack Willoughby, Columbia B-School Hires
Askin to Teach Finance, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 6, 1995, at 5; see also KOHN, supra note
13, at 623 (noting $300 million loss suffered by Merrill Lynch, and $250 million loss suffered by
Salomon Brothers, on these types of interests); Jordan & Schiavetta, supra note 33 (discussing money-
losing investments of some government entities in these exotic interests). Many of these "toxic waste"
interests were the most junior residual tranches of Collateralized Mortgage Obligation ("CMO")
securitizations. Indeed, transaction volume in the CMO market has declined precipitously, with
investors now demanding simpler structures. See Paul Muolo, Who's Killing New CMO Issues?, U.S.
BANKER (Nat'l ed.), Mar. 1996, at 77.
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reduced by securitization. By carving up the lemons inquiry into tasks
amenable to specialization, securitization can help a firm more cheaply show
that it is not a lemon. Appraising risks relating to a group of specified assets,
such as receivables,'34 may be a different skill than appraising and bearing
more general risks, such as those associated with a firm's overall operations.
Some types of financiers might be better at appraising risks associated with
prospects of particular assets, whereas others might be better at appraising
prospects of entire firms. 35 Financiers more specialized in bearing general
firm risks might buy common stock; common stockholders are betting on the
residual results of the firm. Someone better at appraising a particular risk also
may be better at bearing it.'36
Risks associated with securitization securities may be particularly
amenable to appraisal by capital markets investors. Tautologically,
information costs to investigate firms less well-known to the financial
community will be higher. Less well-known firms may be less well-known
for good reason: They may be particularly costly to appraise; they may be
subject to uncertain, but possibly sizeable, liabilities; their businesses may be
very specialized; they may be subject to unsettled or obscure regulatory
regimes; or their small size may limit the potential audience for information,
134. Securitization generally involves betting only on the performance of one specified group of
assets. The receivables included in the transactions will have certain characteristics. Depending on the
type of transaction, these particular receivables may be identified at the inception of the transaction
and/or during the transaction term. Indeed, the bet typically only covers a subset of the risks of those
assets. An important risk, the credit risk of the receivables, will largely have been covered by some
form of credit enhancement, such as insurance.
135. See Buckley, supra note 10, at 1425. Buckley's article notes, in the context of secured
lending, that there may be economies of specialization in the tasks of valuing repayment rights and
valuing bankruptcy rights. Id.; see also D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate
Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277 (1996); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note
1, at 151.
136. And, indeed, institutional investors typically do have specialists who acquire expertise in, for
instance, securities issued in securitization transactions or securities issued by particular types of
companies. Such differentiations arguably imply a benefit to specialization.
Some CMO transactions provide particularly strong evidence of benefits to risk-bearing
specialization. These transactions repackage standard mortgage-backed securities into different
tranches, including senior tranches with predictable repayment schedules, and more junior tranches,
representing the residual interest. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
There is another suggestive piece of evidence that securitization transfers risks to better situated
risk bearers. Rating agencies impose capital requirements on firms; rating agencies will not rate highly
securities issued by firms with insufficient capital. Some rating agencies lower capital requirements for
firms using securitization. If a firm uses securitization, some rating agencies may rate subsequent
issuances of the firm's own securities more highly than they would the securities of an otherwise
comparable, but debt financed, firm with the same capital level. See supra note 86.
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and thus the rewards to obtaining it.'37 These are the firms with the most
severe lemons problems (I will call these firms "lemons firms").
For any transaction to occur, the parties' valuation of the subject matter of
the transaction must be within a sufficiently narrow range. A transaction will
not occur if, for example, the borrower thinks it is an "A" credit risk, and the
lender thinks the borrower is a "C" risk, or the seller thinks its firm is worth
$10,000, and the buyer thinks it is worth $1. Buyer and seller agreement as to
the valuation of an interest in receivables should be comparatively easy to
achieve. Receivables are, after all, rights to receive money from others. The
valuation of the money is not at issue, only the likelihood that it will be paid.
By contrast, valuation of a firm's other, more general interests may require
more extensive consideration of the firm's firm-specific assets,'38 as well as
its prospects, potential liabilities, management, and other matters. Seller and
buyer agreement as to valuation of general interests in a firm will always be
harder and costlier to achieve than agreement as to valuation of interests in
receivables. But the increment of difficulty should be greatest for lemons
firms. Receivables are probably the least firm-specific of all assets because
receivables involve only a right to payment by a third party; there is little
about the firm that affects the receivables' value once they have been
originated.' Thus, the receivables of a lemons firm should not be
appreciably harder to appraise than receivables of a nonlemons firm (a firm
with fewer lemons problems). The remainder of the lemons firm, however,
should be much harder to appraise than the remainder of the nonlemons firm.
In other words, the gains to specialization are likely greater in the case of the
lemons firm because appraisal of a lemons firm is likely a more specialized
endeavor.
After the receivables have been securitized, the firm, of course, has fewer
137. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 153 (suggesting that securitization provides
"unlimited opportunities" for foreign originators to cheaply access U.S. capital markets); see also
Foust et al., supra note 58 (describing securitization's role in fostering global economic growth by
providing financing for below investment grade firms and projects); Richard House, Europe's Flyer in
Aircraft Finance, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l ed.), Mar. 1995, at 25 (discussing view of the CEO
of an airline finance subsidiary that securitization can enable airlines to obtain financing from financial
markets because absent securitization, airlines' ability to seek financing from such markets is
complicated by the "notoriously cyclical, debt ravaged" nature of the airline sector), available in
LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bis File.
138. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 .
FIN. 567, 576 (1988). My reference to firm-specific assets follows Williamson's concept of asset
specificity.
139. See supra 56-67 and accompanying text.
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assets available to other interest holders. And those assets, and the fin, still
have a lemons problem. The lemons problem is no worse-but it now
extends to fewer assets. The lemons "taint" has been removed from the assets
for which it was cheapest to do so: the receivables. 4
A firm's lemons problem might even decrease if its use of securitization
were seen as a positive signal. Receivables are frequently among the best and
most valuable assets of a firm. Securitization presumes that a firm's
receivables are of higher, and sometimes significantly higher, quality than the
rest of the firm. 4' When a firm's receivables are of significantly higher
quality than the firm, and the firm has no regulatory or other special reason to
sell its receivables, a securitization transaction makes the most sense in two
possible and opposite scenarios. One scenario is the good news scenario.
Unbeknownst to the markets, good news is imminent, and the firm's
aggregate value will increase. However, the firm needs financing sooner. The
good news will not cause the receivables to increase in value: their value is a
function of the receivables' obligors, and is not affected by the firm or its
prospects. The good news, however, will cause an increase in the value of the
remainder of the firm. Thus, the firm can get full value for the (high quality)
receivables in a securitization transaction, but not suffer fully the negative
effect on its residual value. When it needs the additional financing, the firm
reasons, its residual value will be higher.
The other possible scenario is the bad news scenario. Unbeknownst to the
markets, the firm is in an "end-game," and is engaged in a last desperate high-
risk ploy to obtain financing. The involvement of rating agencies and insurers
in securitization transactions should preclude the bad news scenario. Rating
agencies and insurers will catch a firm that is a real lemon. 42 Thus, any signal
presented by securitization should be positive and reliable. At the time of the
securitization transaction, the firm's residual value might not decrease by as
much as the sale of the firm's high quality assets might otherwise indicate. In
140. The same principle--concentrating a lemons taint to a smaller group of assets-is involved
in the structuring of securitization transactions. The receivables pool issues different levels of
securitization securities, with the lemons taint concentrated in the lower levels. Valuation of the lower-
level securities is difficult, and investments in these securities have led to some spectacular losses. See
supra note 133.
141. Indeed, securitization has been said to weaken the financial condition of some of its users,
particularly banks who engaged in such transactions to improve their financial condition to meet
regulatory standards; they "cherry pick" their best assets to securitize, leaving the dregs behind. See
Macey & Miller, supra note 120, at 296.
142. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 136-37, 147.
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fact, the firm's residual value might even increase. Any negative effects of the
asset sale would be countered by the positive effect of the signal of imminent
good news. Thus, the firm's choice to engage in the securitization transaction,
in tandem with procedures the transaction requires, may serve as a low-cost
signal 43 that the firm is as it represents itself,'" thereby reducing aggregate
information costs of all of a firm's financiers.
In sum, securitization may be able to reduce information costs associated
with a firm, its securities, and its receivables. But some firms will benefit
more than others. Securitization requires appraisal only of a firm's least firm-
specific assets. The difference between the cost to appraise nonfirm-specific
assets and firm-specific assets will be greatest for lemons firms. Thus, lemons
firms should benefit most from securitization's reduction of information
costs. The cost difference for nonlemons firms is much smaller. Investors
know enough, or can learn enough at comparatively low cost, to greatly
discount the worst case scenario. Thus, nonlemons firms can issue securities
representing secured, unsecured, or residual claims for which investors will
pay high prices.
2. Securitization May Increase a Firm s Future Cash Inflows"
a. Effects of Specialization, Economies of Scope and Reductions in
Agency Costs
Securitization more readily permits specialization in receivables'
origination or retention.'46 The firm engaging in the securitization
transaction-selling its receivables-generally originates the receivables.
Most large, repeat securitizing (selling) firms are specialized in origination:' 47
143. Another positive signal securitization may give is that the firm's treasury department is
creative and makes use of sophisticated financing techniques,
144. But note that this argument is culture-specific. It depends on securitization's frequent use and
acceptance in the United States. In Europe, use of securitization has been viewed as a signal of a bad
news scenario, and investment bankers attempting to promote its increased use have spent considerable
energy fighting this perception. See Margaret Popper, The Asset-Backed Culture Clash,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1994, at 135, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bis File.
145. There is some overlap between the arguments in this part and those in Part 1V.B.1 above.
Appraising receivables more cheaply reduces information costs to a firm and its investors. But better
appraisal can also be part of more efficient dealings with receivables generally which results from
actual and anticipated scrutiny-the firm's cash flows are improved because of the discipline
securitization imposes.
146. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1392 nn.109-10.
147. Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 2.03.
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Banks are specialized in originating mortgages; finance subsidiaries of car
companies are specialized in originating car loans; and credit card companies
are specialized in originating credit card receivables. However, someone
other than the selling firm may be better situated to bear the ongoing risks
associated with the receivables.'48 As discussed in Part IV.B.I.b above, in a
securitization transaction those risks can be transferred to the better-situated
risk bearer. And some firms, such as those whose business is originating
receivables (like banks and credit card companies) may be inspired (and,
under applicable regulations, permitted)14 9 to originate more receivables.
While factoring also enables transfers of ongoing risks associated with
receivables, the greater volume of receivables involved in securitization
transactions should enable more of such transfers. Thus, securitization may
make receivables origination more lucrative. A firm need not engage in an
activity it finds less lucrative, receivables retention, in order to engage in an
activity it finds more lucrative, receivables origination. 5 ° Securitization also
permits more specialization in servicing loans.' Servicing, too, may be an
activity in which specialization promotes efficiencies.'52
Securitization also might inspire the creation of better origination and
collection techniques for receivables, and improve the existing techniques.'53
The effect of better origination and collection on the firm's cash flows is
148. Some reasons why one person might be better situated to bear particular risks than another
are discussed in Part IV.B.1.b, supra. Other reasons might relate to, for instance, the two parties'
respective activities and investment portfolios. Of course, specialization in risk bearing is a factor in
many financing activities, not just securitization.
149. See infra Appendix D, § 1.
150. See Shenker& Colletta, supra note I, at 1392 & nn.109-10.
151. Id.
152. Indeed, the activities of one bank which securitizes commercial mortgages provides some
evidence as to the efficiency of separating these tasks.
Securitization of commercial real estate has pushed the Bank of Boston's commercial operation
towards the residential mortgage-backed model, [Denise] Delaney [division executive, Real Estate
Capital Markets] acknowledges. "We've functionalized our people into originators, underwriters,
and servicers," she explains. Whereas before, "typically, you'd be a relationship manager doing all
three things."
Steve Cocheo, Sea Change for Real Estate Finance?, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1995, at 48, 50.
Securitization also may help exploit economies from separating the servicing task by encouraging the
development of specialist servicers available to service other firms' transactions. See James H. Sait,
Chase Manhattan in Talks to Buy Goldman Sachs' Servicing Unit: Main Street Mortgage Co., AM.
BANKER, Feb. 1, 1995, at 10.
153. See Christine B. O'Malley, Small Business Still Awaits Loan Dollar Flood, BUS. FIRST
COLUMBUS, Mar. 6, 1995, at 33. Greater ease in appraisal and better origination are difficult to
distinguish because both involve processes by which obtaining and providing information about
receivables is done more efficiently.
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somewhat indirect: the firm has sold the receivables and therefore will not
receive the increased funds. But, the firm does capture the benefit of the
increased cash flows in the sales price it receives for the receivables and the
value of any residual interest in the pool it retains (and the receivables it does
not securitize or otherwise sell).
Securitization may improve origination in several respects.15 First, the
techniques developed to make receivables cheaper to appraise'55 likely make
them somewhat cheaper to originate. Second, securitization makes the
origination process more visible. This may reduce adverse selection
problems. 5 6 A firm originating receivables for sale might seem to have less
incentive to exercise care than a firm originating receivables it intends to
keep.'57 But, the actual originators are agents of the firm whose interests may
not be perfectly aligned with those of the firm. Indeed, many individuals
charged with receivables origination decisions may be long gone once, many
years later, a receivable they approved proves uncollectible. By contrast, the
many appraisers involved in a securitization transaction examine the
receivable when it is originated, at a time when the responsible individual is
likely to be occupying the same job. Thus, the individual originating the
receivable may have more to fear from a bad receivable sold in a
154. One third-party benefit of securitization involves loans to high-quality, smaller businesses.
Banks making such loans had apparently shunned risk-based pricing; rather, they had simply made, or
declined to make, a loan. Thus, loans to more and less creditworthy borrowers had been made at the
same rates. Securitization has inspired such banks to institute risk-based pricing for two reasons. First,
the smaller businesses are increasingly obtaining access to the capital markets, including access gained
through their use of securitization. Thus, to hold onto the more creditworthy borrowers, banks are
being forced to offer lower, more risk-based rates. Second, investors in the banks' securitizations of
these loans are increasingly demanding such risk-based pricing. The gains to efficiency and higher-
quality smaller businesses may, however, be at the expense of banks making loans to smaller
borrowers. Such banks presumably did not adopt risk-based pricing before because they did not
compete with capital markets for the business of smaller borrowers. Thus, there must have been more
high quality borrowers paying too much for loans than low quality borrowers paying too little. Banks
fare poorly in a world where smaller, higher quality borrowers have access to cheaper capital markets
financing. The Casefor Risk-Based Pricing: Speech by Alan Greenspan, ABA BANKING J., Jan. 1995,
at 58, 60; Mark Anderson, Money Store Explores Secondary Market for Business Loans; Money Store
Investment Corp., Bus. 3.-SACRAMENTO, Feb. 6, 1995, at 9, available in 1995 WL 8236396.
155. See supra Part 1V.B.I.a.
156. "Adverse selection" is defined as "[t]he problem encountered in the insurance industry that
the sub-population taking out insurance is likely to have less favourable characteristics than the
population in general." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 8 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th
ed. 1992). The term has come to mean, more broadly, the proclivity of any sub-population which can
beneficially misrepresent itself to do so.
157. Part IV.B.I.a, supra, discusses the means by which the firm may obtain, and disseminate,
information as to the receivables' quality.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss4/4
1996] SECURITIZATION: A LOW-COST SWEETENER FOR LEMONS 1097
securitization transaction than a bad receivable that the selling firm retains.
Securitization also may improve the collection of receivables.'58 The
increased visibility of the collections process may reduce moral hazard
problems.'59 Monitors include many of the transaction parties, such as,
perhaps most importantly, the rating agency and insurer."6 Indeed, rating
agencies have developed monitoring guidelines and standards; these
guidelines and standards likely exploit economies of scale, the large volume
of securitization transactions, and the small size of the securitization
community.16 1
Moreover, the small size of the securitization community itself might
prompt a firm to use greater care in origination and collection. The size of the
securitization community virtually ensures that a selling firm will suffer for
its involvement in a problematic securitization transaction. And for some
firms, such as banks, mortgage, credit card, and car loan receivable
originators, which anticipate fairly regular use of securitization, the cost of
careless origination or servicing should be particularly high.
Securitization also may improve the process by which payments are made
to securities holders. Amounts collected on account of the receivables must be
158. CHANGING MARKET, supra note 32, at 5-6. Typically, collection services are contracted for
with the selling firm or its affiliate-that is, the firm which would have performed those services had
the receivables not been securitized. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at § 14.9. Thus, there should be no
specialization benefit involved. In transactions where there are multiple sellers, there may be a new
collection agent appointed. This appointment might yield specialization benefits.
159. Webster's defines moral hazard as "an insurance company's risk as to the insured's
trustworthiness and honesty." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 930 (1989). The term is used more broadly to refer to a person's proclivity to incur greater
costs if some or all of those costs are someone else's responsibility.
160. Schwarcz notes that one efficiency benefit of securitization may be that rating agencies and
insurers are specialists in monitoring. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 151.
161. In more traditional financing arrangements without such mechanisms, collection tasks would
likely be done by the firm under a less formal arrangement. The firm's employees, in furtherance of
their own advantage or leisure, might be tempted to collect the receivables in a less than diligent
manner, or be lax in paying (or not paying) over the collection proceeds. Securitization can bring
needed discipline to the process.
Finally, receivables sellers (in the health care industry] are required to track payments, and
abnormally high delinquency rates trigger a wind-down of the financing. This requirement
encourages borrowers to effectively monitor their receivables, to monitor reimbursement by
individual payers, and to ensure that the collection process is efficiently designed and executed.
Receivables days outstanding, a measure of efficiency, is invariably improved after securitization.
See Sen & Lawler, supra note 123, at 32. By comparison, in a factoring transaction, factors might take
over collections themselves. The factoring transaction structure might not, however, be of a scale and
nature as to profitably employ the collection techniques developed for use in securitization
transactions. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 145-46.
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held and disbursed to pool securities holders. Custodial and disbursement
services are contracted for with a third party, often a trustee. 62 The trustee is a
specialist in holding and disbursing money. More importantly, perhaps, a
trustee is a specialist in being honest. The trustee's honesty is available at low
cost: trustees are not (and are not paid to be) in the business of being smart.
The "product" of trustees apparently was crafted to be a very low-cost
product, and employees who can exercise judgment are of course a much
more expensive commodity than those who can follow orders. 63
162. This assumes the pool will be formed as a trust. Many, if not most, pools are formed as trusts.
If there is no trustee, the trustee-specific issues, costs, and benefits I cite are not available; however,
transactions not involving trustees have their own mechanisms to assure honesty and care, which
should yield most of the same benefits as are available with trustees. For ease of analysis, I do not
separately analyze transactions not involving a trustee.
163. The contracts with trustees, indentures and trust agreements, provide support for this
characterization. Both types of agreements read like "how-to" manuals, specifying in extraordinary
detail how a trustee is to perform its duties. And a trustee who, notwithstanding the level of detail, is
faced with a decision requiring discretion, and makes the wrong decision, is protected by numerous
disclaimers of liability. In most matters, the trustee is only liable for gross negligence or wilful
misconduct. The trustee is not liable for honest errors ofjudgment. And the trustee is permitted to seek
the advice of experts in questionable cases, and is not liable for action taken in reliance on that advice.
Consider the following provisions:
(a) The Indenture Trustee is authorized to take such actions as are expressly set forth in the
Surety Bond. In the event that on the second Business Day before a Payment Date, and again on
the Business Day before a Payment Date, the Indenture Trustee has not received sufficient moneys
to pay all principal of and interest on the Notes due on such Payment Date, the Indenture Trustee
shall immediately notify the Insurer or its designee on the same Business Day by telephone or
telecopy, confirmed in writing by registered or certified mail, of the amount of the deficiency.
(b) If the deficiency is made up in whole or in part prior to or on the relevant Payment Date,
the Indenture Trustee shall so notify the Insurer or its designee.
Indenture, supra note 48, § 7.2.
(c) The Issuer [the pool] shall punctually perform and observe all of its obligations and
agreements contained in this Indenture, the Basic Documents and in the instruments and
agreements included in the Trust Estate, including but not limited to filing or causing to be filed all
UCC financing statements required to be filed by the terms of this Indenture in accordance with
and within the time period provided for herein and therein.
Id. §3.6.
(a) The Trustee shall not be required to take any action hereunder or under any Basic
Document if the Trustee shall have reasonably determined, or shall have been advised by counsel,
that such action is likely to result in liability on the part of the Trustee or is contrary to the terms
hereof or of any Basic Document or is otherwise contrary to law.
(b) In the event that the Trustee is unable to decide between alternative courses of action
permitted or required by, or is unsure as to the application of, any provision of this Agreement or
any Basic Document, or any such provision is ambiguous as to its application, or is, or appears to
be, in conflict with any other applicable provision, or in the event that this Agreement permits any
determination by the Trustee or is silent or is incomplete as to the course of action that the Trustee
is required to take with respect to a particular set of facts, the Trustee may give notice (in such form
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Trustees also are in the business of not becoming subject to Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code.'" The trustee is exceedingly unlikely to go bankrupt
There is a legal distinction between the entity (typically, a trust company but
sometimes some other financial institution) which serves as trustee and the
trustee. The trust company's creditors are not creditors of the trustee, nor are
they creditors of the pool for which the trustee serves as trustee. Moreover,
the entities which act as trustees typically are not subject to the federal
bankruptcy code; 65 the regime which governs their bankruptcy apparently
respects far more the agreed-upon rights and duties of the trustee.'66
The extra layer described above is needed to preserve securitization's
insulation of the pool securities holders from the selling firm. The receivables
are sold to a pool which issues the pool securities. The pool must make
payments on the pool securities from the receivables payments. Thus, the
pool needs to arrange for collection of the receivables, custody of the funds
collected, and disbursement of the funds to pool securities holders. I argued
above that from this necessity may come certain benefits. These benefits may
not be sufficient to justify the use of the extra layer, but may make the extra
layer pay for itself. More generally, competition among some of the extra
parties involved in a securitization transaction also may add value. For
example, insurers are designing creative securitization transaction structures
which involve risks they have particular expertise in appraising and
bearing.16
7
Firms, such as banks, finance, mortgage, and leasing companies, and
as shall be appropriate under the circumstances) to the Owner requesting instruction and, to the
extent that the Trustee acts or refrains from acting in good faith in accordance with any such
instruction received, the Trustee shall not be liable, on account of such action or inaction, to any
Person. If the Trustee shall not have received appropriate instruction within 10 days of such notice
(or within such shorter period of time as reasonably may be specified in such notice or may be
necessary under the circumstances) it may, but shall be under no duty to, take or refrain from taking
such action not inconsistent with this Agreement or the Basic Documents as it shall deem to be in
the best interests of the Owner, and shall have no liability to any Person for such action or inaction.
Amended and Restated Declaration and Agreement of Trust Relating to [Trust] by and Between
Wilmington Trust Co., as Trustee, and [Seller of the Receivables or its Successor in Interest] § 4.05
(June 1, 1994) (on file with author).
164. 11U.S.C. §§ 101-1330(1994).
165. Certain entities are ineligible to be debtors under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1994). These entities include the types of financial institutions that
typically serve as trustees. Instead, these entities are subject to various state or federal insolvency or
liquidation proceedings. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, 1377-78 & nn.32-36.
166. See generally Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 135-36.
167. See supra note 130.
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credit card issuers, whose main business involves receivables (I will call them
financing firms) should benefit most from the ability to specialize in
origination and perhaps servicing. However, they should benefit least from
securitization's effect of inspiring more efficient origination and servicing.
Financing firms already have sufficient incentive to efficiently originate and
service their receivables absent securitization. Firms whose main business
does not involve receivables (I will call them nonfinancing firms) should
benefit more from more efficient origination and servicing. They should
scarcely benefit, however, from the ability to specialize in origination.
Lemons firms, whether they are financing firms or not, should benefit most
from more efficient monitoring of their origination and servicing. For such
firms, investor discounts for moral hazard problems associated with
receivables would be particularly large, but should be amenable to reduction
with monitoring.
b. Regulatory Costs and Subsidies:68 Taxes
Some firms are subject to regulatory costs that securitization can help
reduce. An account of how securitization can reduce regulatory costs involves
exploration of various regulatory schemes applicable to different types of
firms; I discuss some of the more important such schemes in Appendix D.169
For many types of transactions, the regulatory cost reductions that
securitization permits may be significant; however, in some transactions,
securitization's contribution may be smaller than first appears. Securitization
helps some firms meet regulatory mandates, such as those requiring them to
maintain "adequate" levels of capital. 7 ' However, the regulatory mandates
may not differ significantly from implicit market mandates. For instance,
financial firms not subject to the regulatory scheme mandating capital
adequacy are held to somewhat similar capital adequacy standards by rating
agencies.17' Securitization's contribution, thus, may be less to reduce costs of
complying with regulations, and more to achieve cost-effectively what the
168. I use the term "subsidies" broadly to include relief from generally applicable laws and
regulations, and provision of services (such as credit enhancement services) by a governmental body
for a less-than-market price.
169. There are many regulatory regimes that influence some firms in favor of, or against,
securitization. Examples include the regimes governing insurers and health care providers. A full
consideration of such regimes and their effects is beyond the scope of this Article.
170. See infra Appendix D, § 2.
171. Seesupra note 86.
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regulators require and the markets reward.
Securitization also may reduce other types of regulatory costs, such as
bankruptcy costs. Securitization moves some of a firm's assets (receivables)
further away from bankruptcy's ambit 72 Indeed, the transaction is carefully
structured to have this effect. If, as has been argued, the process of
bankruptcy is inefficient, 73 this feature of securitization could yield cost
savings. But the closer a firm is to bankruptcy, the more difficult and
uncertain it is to effectively remove some of the firm's assets. Either the
securitization transaction will not be done, or it will be done in a particularly
costly manner. 74 The firms closest to bankruptcy probably will not
experience much benefit; however, the firms further away from bankruptcy
might experience more of a benefit. But bankruptcy costs presumably have
the least effect on the value of firms further away from bankruptcy. Thus, the
magnitude of any bankruptcy-cost reduction benefit that securitizations might
offer should be small.
Securitization can exploit the existence of regulatory costs and benefits in
other ways. Applicable laws and regulations have sometimes prevented or
discouraged some investors from investing in lower rated securities. 7 The
price of higher rated securities may have risen to reflect this regulatorily
inspired demand, thus making the spread between lower rated and higher
rated securities too large, given underlying cash flows. 76 Indeed, such an
172. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 135-36.
173. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley, The American Stay, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPUNARY L.J. 733, 744-61
(1994).
174. See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 142.
175. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing the rating standards).
176. Shupack cites this regulatorily inspired "preference" by affected investors as an example of
investor differences (clientele effects) that could account for securitization's positive-sum effects. See
Paul M. Shupack, The Politics of Article 9: On Boundaries and Definitions: A Commentary on Dean
Baird, 80 VA. L. REV. 2273, 2296 (1994); Shupack, supra note 9, at 809 & n.72; supra note 14. In a
Modigliani and Miller world, the prices of all securities would, of course, be dictated by the net present
value of their underlying cash flows. And the price of a device, such as insurance, which increases net
present value, would be the same as the value of the increase. Thus, if a clientele effect favoring higher
rated securities is an impetus for securitization, the higher rated securities must enjoy a demand
premium. If securitization is simply a cheaper way of achieving higher quality (and thus higher
ratings), a clientele effect is not needed to account for its benefits.
However, as I argue in the text and in note 14, supra, an explanation of securitization based on
clientele effects manifested in a demand premium for higher-rated securities is incomplete. Lower
quality firms have a variety of ways of issuing higher rated securities. Shupack's account does not
address why securitization might have been selected rather than one of those other ways. The task of
demonstrating why securitization might have been selected involves showing why securitization is a
better way to achieve higher quality---a showing that does not require clientele effects. Moreover,
clientele effects favoring higher rated securities cannot explain the securitization transactions that are
Washington University Open Scholarship
1102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
effect is not implausible: the laws and regulations favoring high quality
securities apply to many of the largest investors, such as many insurance
companies, mutual funds, and pension plans.17 By helping lower quality
firms issue higher rated securities, securitization could help such firms
capture part of any such demand premium. But lower quality firms would
presumably benefit at the expense of higher quality firms who did not need
securitization to help them issue highly rated securities.
The effect of the regulatorily inspired demand for higher quality securities
is difficult to gauge. Compounding the difficulties, applicable regulations
define the requisite level of quality differently;17 1 while most include the top
four rating agency categories, some include only the top two or three. 79 And,
given the large volume of securitization transactions, it seems plausible that
securitization should eventually cause any demand premium to shrink, or
even disappear. Thus, securitization's ability to exploit a high-rating demand
premium may not be long-lived.
Moreover, a lower quality firm has alternative means of issuing highly
rated securities. A firm could increase the level of its capital. A firm's level of
capital is an important factor in its credit rating; indeed, rating agencies
specify capital levels for each rating. Or, a firm can obtain insurance for the
securities, just as it often does for securitization securities. A higher quality
firm does not need securitization to issue highly rated securities. Thus, as with
the other benefits claimed for securitization, the appropriate measure is the
increment of cost-savings over the alternative means of achieving the same
end. 80
unrated or done by higher quality firms who are readily able to issue highly rated securities in more
traditional financing transactions.
177. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 39,43.
179. Id.
180. And securitization can reduce other regulatory costs. In 1994, New York City securitized
$208 million of notes backed by delinquent tax receivables. Had it borrowed the funds, it would likely
have had to cede control of its finances to a control board. Ann Monroe, A Taste for the Different and
Difficult, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1995, at 77, 78; see also Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note
1, § 1.06.B.5.g; Andrew Bary, Trading Points: Thank You, Deadbeats, BARRON'S, June 27, 1994, at
MwI0.
There are still other benefits which are not strictly regulatory, but are akin to regulatory cost
reductions. For instance, firms subject to covenants in their loan agreements precluding or making
more costly additional debt also might obtain financing in securitization transactions. Financing
Techniques, supra note 1, at 531. To the extent the transactions implicate the same sorts of concerns as
do additional borrowings, lenders should increasingly use the same safeguards against securitizations
as they do against borrowing. Thus, this form of "lender arbitrage" should no longer be possible as
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Tax considerations may be relevant in a firm's decision to use
securitization. Securitization can be structured either as a borrowing or as a
sale of the receivables. The firm can structure the transaction to obtain the tax
treatment it finds most advantageous. For instance, if the transaction is treated
as a borrowing, the firm can deduct the interest payments made to pool
securities holders.' If the transaction is treated as a sale of assets (the
receivables), the firm cannot deduct interest payments, and may have to take
any gain or loss on the sale into its income." 2 Moreover, the firm can obtain
tax "borrowing" treatment for some purposes but "sales" treatment for
others. 3 Securitization does not, however, enable a firm to obtain tax
treatment it otherwise could not obtain. In any event, tax structuring to
achieve the desired treatment may be costly. 4 Thus, the magnitude of any
tax benefit securitization might offer should be quite small.'85
3. Securitization May Reduce Transaction Costs
The foregoing discussed the process of crafting securities of both higher
quality and greater liquidity. Some of securitization's benefits relate only to
increases in liquidity. One such benefit involves reduction of transaction
costs.
Each investor wants an investment portfolio that meets its needs. Every
new type of security created can reduce an investor's transaction costs in
assembling its desired portfolio. A new security can have a risk and reward
configuration the investor otherwise could have obtained only by acquiring,
at higher cost, several securities. Securitization securities are new types of
securities, sometimes offering novel risk and reward configurations. For
instance, some pool securities represent senior interests in diversified
receivables; others represent more exotic and riskier residual interests,
payable only if the senior interests are repaid in full.' t 6 Indeed, before
securitizations become more common and lenders become more savvy. But the substantive differences
between secured bon-owing and securitization may very well be sufficient to justify lenders in
continuing the different treatment.
181. I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
182. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001 (1994).
183. See supra notes 84-85, 98-100 and accompanying text.
184. For a general discussion of tax considerations involved in structuring securitization
transactions, see FRANKEL, supra note 1, at §§ 8.10-.15.11.
185. Indeed, very few securitization transactions are donefor tax reasons; some, however, are.
186. Moreover, as discussed in Appendix D § 2, infra, a securitization security may be valued
because firms required to maintain a certain level of capital against each asset need retain less capital
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securitization, some portfolios might have been impossible to assemble.
Whether or not a portfolio having risk and return characteristics identical to a
portfolio including pool securities could have been constructed pre-
securitization, securitization likely makes construction of such a portfolio
easier and cheaper. And the benefits go beyond the role securitization
securities can play in helping investors construct their desired portfolios. Each
new type of financial instrument assists investors seeking to craft ever more
precise portfolios. Thus, each instrument's existence makes the others more
valuable.
This benefit seems quite small in most cases. 7 And there does not seem
to be much difference in its magnitude for different types of firms. However,
the cost to obtain the benefit is also likely quite small. The additional
increment of effort needed is minimal, once the transaction's other structuring
objectives have been met.
4. Summary
I have identified several benefits securitization may offer. One is to reduce
information costs. Securitization may inspire the development and use of
lower cost appraisal techniques for some of a firm's receivables.
Securitization also may inspire a firm to create a capital structure consisting
of securities that lend themselves to lower cost appraisal. Lower cost
appraisal could lead to more efficient risk bearing; someone better situated to
appraise a risk may be better at bearing it. Indeed, securitization may reduce
against securitization securities than the loans underlying such securities. More generally, there are
many reasons why an investor might value a security representing a particular risk and return
configuration. One story told on Wall Street is that securities representing rights to receive principal
payments from other financial instruments were originally developed for sale to investors whose
religion forbade them from receiving "interest."
187. This benefit does exploit investor differences, but not systematic ones. The economies of
scope from crafting tailored cash flows are likely present, but are unlikely to be large. Indeed, the
greatest benefit appears to be in the ability to offer a large selection of securities-to "customize"
securities for some particular set of investor needs at slightly lower cost than the investor would incur
purchasing comparable securities itself. An illustration by Lyn Perlmuth of securitization's ability to
help customize securities for investors follows:
Chrysler has concocted a total rate of return bond, since used by GMAC [General Motors
Acceptance Corporation] as well, that guarantees investors no principal prepayment for a specified
period, often a year. In what might be called a something-for-everyone bond, GMAC earlier this
year issued a $3 billion eight-lranche auto-loan-backed deal containing money market, total-rate-of-
return, floating rate, and fixed rate pieces.
Lyn Perlmuth, An Asset-Backed Upsurge, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1993, at 167.
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aggregate information costs for all of a firm's financiers in a variety of ways.
Securitization helps to extract, from a mass of hard-to-quantify risks, some
particular risks that can be more easily quantified. And a firm's selection of
securitization may be a low-cost signal of its quality.
Securitization also may increase a firm's cash inflows in several ways.
Securitization permits specialization in receivables origination and servicing.
It also may inspire more efficient receivables origination and management,
and lead to reductions in agency costs. Securitization also may increase a
firm's cash inflows by reducing regulatory costs. It may reduce costs of
complying with applicable regulatory regimes, or help make available certain
regulatory subsidies. Moreover, it may reduce bankruptcy costs by moving
some assets (receivables) from the firm to a more bankruptcy-remote
location. Securitization also may permit a firm to select differently labelled
treatments for tax and other purposes, and select either a debt or an equity tax
regime for the transaction, whichever is more favorable. Finally,
securitization also may reduce transaction costs associated with the assembly
of a particular portfolio or make possible the assembly of a theretofore
impossible portfolio.
Of these benefits, two seem largest: information cost reductions and
regulatory cost reductions. Securitization may offer significant reductions in
information costs. However, this benefit seems larger for some firms,
particularly lemons firms, than for others.
The magnitude of securitization's regulatory cost reduction benefit also
varies markedly among transactions. For some transactions, the benefit is
extremely large; for others, it may be quite small. The largest regulatory cost
reduction benefits occur only under regimes applicable to particular firms or
transactions. The benefits of more generally applicable regulatory cost
reductions are likely to be smaller. Bankruptcy cost reductions, for instance,
should be of some benefit, but mostly to firms whose financial condition is
middling-sufficiently good that the transaction structure is viable without
costly safeguards, but not so good that the prospect of bankruptcy is
exceedingly remote. Tax savings, too, should be fairly small. Generally, all
securitization does is make less costly a firm's choice of financing structures
by allowing it to choose among the previously available tax treatments.
Securitization's other benefits seem smaller. Nonfinancing firms should
benefit more from better origination and servicing of their receivables. They
may not have had sufficient resources or incentive to put into place the
mechanisms the securitization transaction structure requires. By contrast,
financing firms likely will have had both the resources and incentive to
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originate and service their receivables efficiently, even absent securitization.
Some financing firms may benefit from being able to specialize in receivables
origination-if others really are much better risk bearers, then this benefit
might be fairly sizeable. And specialization in receivables servicing may
enable more efficient, and cheaper, servicing. Another benefit securitization
may offer also follows from carving up tasks and assigning them to
specialists: those specialists may compete with each other to help structure
transactions that use their expertise yet more efficiently. 88 All firms may
benefit from securitization's ability to assist investors in assembling
investment portfolios. However, securitization's contribution is simply to
offer a new type of security, somewhat different from the securities
previously available. The increment of additional value added should not be
significant.
Some of the foregoing benefits rely on differences between investors. For
instance, the regulatory constraints on purchases of lower quality securities,
and the regulatory subsidies for purchases of securitization securities, apply
only to certain subsets of investors.'89 Similarly, some specialization benefits
rely on the existence of investors with different skills and expertise. However,
many other benefits do not rely on investor differences. For instance,
specialization of third parties likely benefits all investors: if receivables can be
appraised and monitored more cheaply by a rating agency and insurer,
investor differences should not appreciably affect the availability of this
benefit. Most importantly, however, the information cost reducing effect
responsible for sweetening lemons firms does not rely on investor differences.
While some investors may be better situated than others to appraise lemons
firms, securitization's solution to the lemons problem is to extract from such
firms the risks more readily appraised by nonspecialists (or, more precisely,
specialists in appraising nonfin-specific assets).
This Part has considered how securitization might benefit different types
of firms. The next Part considers how these benefits might account for the
securitization transactions being done today.
C. Who Does Securitization Transactions, and How Might They Benefit?
The three government-sponsored entities ("GSEs"), Fannie Mae, Freddie
188. See supra note 130.
189. See supra Part IV.B.2.b; infra Appendix D.
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Mac, and Ginnie Mae, are responsible for the vast bulk of securitizations now
outstanding.' The GSEs securitize residential mortgages: Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac securitize mortgages to high-quality ("A") borrowers, and
Ginnie Mae securitizes mortgages guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration or the Veterans Administration.191
Other firms engaging in securitization transactions are quite varied. They
include firms in various lines of business, large and small firms, and higher
rated and lower rated fimns.' Firms commencing securitization transactions
in 1995"9 include: (i) Chase Manhattan Bank, whose parent's debt S&P rated
A/A-; (ii) Ford Motor Credit Company, whose debt S&P rated A+; (iii)
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., whose debt was unrated by S&P, but whose
main stockholder, Harcourt General, Inc., had debt S&P rated BBB/BBB+;
(iv) Bally Health & Tennis Corp., whose debt was unrated by S&P and which
was being spun off from Bally Entertainment Corp., whose debt S&P rated
B+/BB; (v) the Money Store, Inc., whose debt was unrated by S&P; and (vi)
Olympic Financial, Ltd., whose debt was also unrated by S&P. General
Electric Capital Company ("GECC"), a subsidiary of General Electric
Company, has also done securitization transactions; S&P rated GECC's debt
AAA. Using ratings as a rough indicator of the severity of a firm's lemons
190. Because of recent movements of interest rates, mortgage originations and hence mortgage
securitization transactions have declined precipitously. Mortgage securitization transactions thus
represent a much smaller proportion of securitization securities issued in 1994 than securitization
securities outstanding as of December 31, 1994. See supra note 4; infra Appendix A; see also Anita
Raghavan, Collapse Among Mortgage-Backed Securities Leaves New Issues Down 57%for the Year,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at 38. The GSE share is also declining as a percentage of total mortgage
securitizations. This likely reflects an increase in "nonstandard" mortgage originations, which
represent the bulk of non-GSE securitizations, as a percentage of total mortgage originations.
191. Seeinfra Appendix D, § 1.
192. Rating agencies do not rate firms; rather, they rate firms' debt. See supra note 39. Many
firms, and most large firms, obtain ratings for some of their debt. Investors in public transactions, and
many investors in private transactions, require debt they purchase to be rated. See supra notes 37-44
and accompanying text.
The ratings in the text are Standard & Poor's ratings of the firms' long-term nonconvertible bonds,
obtained from Standard & Poor's Corporate Descriptions plus News of the firms, available on LEXIS,
Compny Library, Spdesc File. The Corporate Descriptions I use have a load date of October 19, 1995.
Firms' debt ratings change over time; a systematic exploration of the calibre of firms using
securitization would have to take into account the firm's debt rating at the time it does each
securitization transaction.
193. All these firms, other than Bally, filed registration statements with the Securities Exchange
Commission for public offerings of securitization securities in 1995. Bally's offering of securitization
securities was described in Jeffrey Keegan & Ronan Donohue, Bally's Plays Musical Agents On Its
Troubled 144A Deal, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 6, 1995, at 15; and Bally's Health & Tennis
$200 Million Notes Rated 'B' By Fitch, PR Newswire, July 12, 1995.
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problems, the foregoing suggests that both lemons and nonlemons firms use
securitization. Among the lemons firms, too, may be those whose debt is
unrated, especially if the debt bears high interest rates.'94
The types of receivables securitized include: (i) mortgages of types not
securitized by the GSEs, such as "jumbo" mortgages,'95 mortgages to "B" and
"C" borrowers,'9 6 and commercial mortgages; (ii) credit card receivables; and
(iii) auto loans. Increasingly, business loans, auto equipment leases, and trade
receivables are being securitized.'97 Other receivables sometimes securitized
include health care, airline ticket, and lease receivables. 8 These receivables
represent a small, but increasing, portion of the aggregate securitizations. 99
For some firms, regulatory benefits-that is, regulatory subsidies and/or
cost reductions-are clearly a large impetus for using securitization.2°0 A
notable example is government-related, mortgage-backed securities
transactions. The GSEs were statutorily directed to do these transactions; the
transactions receive significant government subsidies. Financing firms receive
regulatory benefits for selling their conforming loans to the GSEs. And, as
discussed in Appendix D, some firms, such as banks, are subject to regulatory
regimes that may favor securitization. In Modigliani and Miller terms, a very
simple account can be given: there are regulatory benefits which these users
of securitization can obtain.20'
For other firms, regulatory benefits are less important, and other benefits
194. Olympic Financial's debt bore interest at rates between 9.875% to 13%; by contrast, GECC's
debt bore interest at rates between 5.25% to 9.95%. See Standard & Poor's Corporate Descriptions
plus News, available in LEXIS, Compny Library, Spdesc File. Of course, many factors affect the
interest rates on a firm's debt, including the terms of the debt and the prevailing interest rates at the
time the debt is issued.
195. Jumbo mortgages are mortgages for amounts exceeding $207,000. They generally have
higher fees, and higher interest rates, than traditional loans. Jonathan Auerbach, Buyers of Pricey
Properties Save with Piggyback Deals, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1996, at B10; see also infra note 236.
196. One third-party benefit of securitization transactions is that more mortgage loans to lower
rated borrowers are likely being made, and at lower rates, as the secondary market for such loans
expands. See Phil Britt, B&C Lending Growth Predicted; Nonconforming Bank Loans, SAVINGS &
COMMUNITY BANKER, Mar. 1995, at 43.
197. See Essenburg, supra note 60; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
198. See generally supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text
199. See infra Appendix A.
200. See supra Part IV.B.2.b; see also infra Appendix D. Indeed, one commentator's account of
securitization by banks attributes the use largely to regulatory benefits, and somewhat to the benefits of
specialization. See Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, §§ 1.02.A, 2.01-.03.
201. The regulators, however, may have encouraged (and subsidized) securitization, rather than
other means of achieving their end of promoting housing, partly in recognition of the efficiencies the
transaction structure offers.
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are more important. I have argued that lemons firms should enjoy the greatest
nonregulatory benefits. What lemons firms need, far more than nonlemons
firms, is "sweetening"--a means to convince investors that the firm is not as
"sour" as they fear. I argued in Part IV.B that securitization can sweeten a
lemons firm at lower cost by reducing investors' information costs about the
firm.2" But, as discussed above, many securitization transactions are done by
fairly highly rated firms. 2 3 Highly rated-that is, nonlemons-firms may
benefit mostly from small cost savings which, in the aggregate, make
securitization no more costly, and perhaps somewhat less costly, than such
firms' financing alternatives. Such firms may use securitization principally to
arbitrage small mispricings among financial markets.2°4 At any particular
time, one market may offer better rates than another. A firm poised to select
among markets can take advantage of the better rates. The cost savings I have
identified should make securitization sufficiently low-cost, compared to the
alternatives, that it can be used for this purpose. This model has a place in a
Modigliani and Miller world: securitization is assisting the arbitrage on which
their theorem relies to correct market mispricings.2 °5 Indeed, Modigliani and
202. I have argued that lemons firms' residual risks are harder to appraise than those of nonlemons
firms, but that their receivables are not appreciably harder to appraise. The same argument should
favor lemons' firms use of factoring over the other means of financing available to them. Empirical
work would be needed to determine the extent of lemons firms' pre-securitization and, for that matter,
present-day use of reliance on factoring.
203. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
204. Indeed, even without differences in rates among markets, securitization might present a close,
but worthwhile, call, for reasons other than "financing cost savings," narrowly defined. A healthcare
industry publication, Healthcare Financial Management, states that only firms whose senior unsecured
debt is rated A or lower will save on financing costs; the implication necessarily is that firms with debt
rated above A will not save on financing costs. Sen & Lawler, supra note 123, at 32. The reasons they
give for A+ or better firms to use securitization include better matching of inflows and outflows, and
fewer restrictive covenants--reasons that a broader definition of financing costs would encompass.
205. The process by which market differentials are set is dynamic. It depends on arbitragers
continuously looking for, and trading away, small mispricings. There must be occasional mispricings,
or the arbitragers who correct them could not be compensated for their efforts. Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 623 (1984); see also
Buckley, supra note 10, at 1422, 1424. Indeed, rating agencies have told me that they look favorably
upon companies that have the securitization arrow in their quiver for precisely this reason.
Moreover, securitization may help the market set appropriate prices for securities generally. The
process by which prices in financial markets are set is necessarily noisy and fluid. It virtually requires
different (plausible) estimates of expected future cash flows; many, if not most, transactions occur
because the buyer's estimate is higher than the seller's. Securitization may assist in choosing among
estimates by providing some additional information, namely the appropriate relationship between
particular higher and lower valued uses. Securitization also may help markets correct prices by
eliminating any demand premium high quality securities might otherwise have on account of
regulatorily inspired excess demand. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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Miller's theorem can even accommodate black-box reasons for such
mispricings, so long as the mispricings are short-lived.
Empirical work would be needed to determine how particular firms
benefit from using securitization. However, practitioner accounts of
securitization's benefits, as well as various accounts in industry
publications.0 6  of why firms use securitization, support the two
characterizations of securitization's nonregulatory benefits described in the
preceding paragraph. First, securitization offers larger, lemons-sweetening
benefits for firms with more severe lemons problems. Second, securitization
offers small arbitrage-style benefits for firms with many other financing
possibilities. As discussed in the Introduction and Part IV.A, securitization's
benefits, according to practitioners, are mainly to increase a firm's access to
capital markets, and permit the issuance of higher quality, higher rated
securities. Lemons firms' access to capital markets, and ability to issue higher
quality securities, are generally far more limited than that of nonlemons firms;
206. In a poll conducted by the Institutional Investor, chief financial officers of various firms were
asked a number of questions about securitization. The respondents represented a wide range of firms,
including manufacturing (49%), financial (14.1%), and service firms (18.1%). Securitization
Hesitation, supra note 59, at 241. The poll was sent to 1000 CFOs; 100 responded. The respondents'
firms varied widely in size:
- 3A% had gross revenues less than $100 million,
- 20.1% had gross revenues between $100 million and $499 million,
- 20.8% had gross revenues between $500 million and $999 million,
- 28.9% had gross revenues between $1 billion and $2.9 billion,
- 10.1% had gross revenues between $3 billion and $4.9 billion, and
- 16.8% had gross revenues of $5 billion or more.
Telephone interview with Michael Pelz, Staff Writer, Institutional Investor (Nov. 8, 1995).
The CFOs were asked why their firms might find securitization attractive. The most common
answer was "to diversify funding sources" (49%). The next most common answers were: "investor
interest is strong" (32.7%); "company is highly leveraged or transitional and is facing steep borrowing
costs" (30.6%); and "securitization is more efficient and profitable than selling loans in the secondary
market"(26.5%). Id.
Other accounts are similar;, diversification of financing sources and lower financing costs are often
cited. And the benefits to lower quality issuers of increased access to financing are sometimes noted.
See Chisholm, supra note 67, at 1; Kenneth Cline, Banks Steered Clear of Securitizing Car Loans in
'94, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1995, at 6; Essenburg, supra note 60; Sen & Lawler, supra note 123;
Finances: After a Record Year, Card-Bond Sales Could Hit New Highs in 1995, CREDIT CARD NEWS,
Jan. 15, 1995.
Diversification of financing sources and exploitation of "strong investor interest" sound like
arbitrage-style reasons. Financing costs savings, including efficiencies over selling loans in the
secondary markets, could be part of an arbitrage story or a lemons-sweetening story. The use of
securitization by a highly leveraged or transitional company, or one that needs increased access to
capital markets, is part of a lemons-sweetening story.
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thus, these benefits should be of more value for lemons firms. This Article
has attempted to show how securitization could offer these benefits." 7
V. CONCLUSION
Securitization is a method for crafting higher valued securities from
receivables streams. Violations of various Modigliani and Miller assumptions
explain why securitization might be able to achieve net increases in value.
One such violation is the existence of regulatory costs and benefits. Indeed,
securitization seems very much a creation of the regulatory regime. Without
the regulatory regime, the securitization transaction structure itself might not
have developed. The initial structuring expenditure was, to a not-insignificant
extent, borne by the U.S. government.2"' Moreover, a governmental body, the
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), structured the first commercial
mortgage securitization transactions, thereby solving problems the private
markets had not.
The private markets were able to solve the problems involved in
securitizing credit card receivables. 2" Credit cards are, however, the best case
for a private market solution, requiring only sophisticated financial modelling
that investment bankers could develop from the comfort of their own offices.
Private (nongovernment) users might-or might not-have been sufficiently
motivated to create the securitization transaction structure. Indeed, the private
users who would seem to benefit most, firms with the most severe lemons
problems, likely have the fewest resources with which to have created the
structure. Securitization may have met the strong test of survival; however,
but for U.S. government involvement in the genesis of the transaction
structure, it might not have met the weak test of birth.2"' Certainly, if there
were no regulatory benefits available, the securitization "world" would be
207. This Article deals with the reasons why a firm would securitize receivables it originated in
the course of its business. There are some firms whose sole business is buying and securitizing
receivables they consider underpriced. For example, a practitioner told me about one transaction in
which a firm bought and securitized receivables subject to a liability it believed the market
overweighted. After a large volume of these transactions had been done, demand and experience with
the receivables eliminated the difference between the market's appraisal of the liability and that of the
firm, and the transaction ceased to be profitable.
208. See infra Appendix D for a history of securitization transactions.
209. See supra note 122.
210. Victor P. Goldberg & John Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. ECON. 369, 371 (1987) (coining the terms "weak
test of birth" and "strong test of survival").
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quite different.
But, I argue, securitization offers far more than regulatory benefits.
Securitization seems to reduce a variety of real-world costs, such as
information, agency, and transaction costs. For some firms, securitization's
nonregulatory benefits may be fairly small. Finns with many financing
alternatives (and, most likely, the mildest lemons problems) may use
securitization mostly to arbitrage small price differences in financial markets.
For other firms, the benefits may be larger. Firms with fewer financing
alternatives (and, most likely, the most severe lemons problems) may use
securitization because it offers far lower financing costs. Investors can limit
costly appraisals of residual risks, and confine their inquiries to assets far
more cheaply appraised: rights to receive money. At low cost, securitization
has sweetened the lemon.
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APPENDIX A: SECURITIZATION SECURITIES OUTSTANDING AND ISSUED2 1
Table 1: Securities Outstanding as of December 31, 1994212 (in Billions of
Dollars)
Mortgage-Backed Securities:
Government Sponsored Mortgage-Backed Securities 1467.80
Private Issuer Mortgage-Backed Securities 235.30
Total Mortgage-Backed Securities 1703.10
Asset-Backed Securities:
Credit Card Securitizations (Consumer) 94.40
Auto Loan Securitizations (Consumer) 34.90
Other Consumer and Business Securitizations 58.50
Total Asset-Backed Securities 187.80
Total Mortgage- and Asset-Backed Securities 1890.90
Table 2: Securities Issued in 1994 (in Billions ofDollars)
Mortgage-Backed Securities:2 3
Government Sponsored Mortgage-Backed Securities 361.20
211. These figures do not include all transactions. While most public transactions are likely
included, (and for the issuance figures, all public transactions should be included), some non-public
transactions, and particularly those involving more exotic asset types, may not be included. Thus, both
the outstanding and issuance numbers are understated. One type of transaction with significant
transaction volume is "asset-backed commercial paper," short-term securities typically backed by trade
and other corporate receivables. These transactions are typically exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933; hence, they are not included in computations made from
public filings, and are more difficult to estimate. The Federal Reserve's "outstandings" figures do,
however, include commercial paper.
212. The numbers for outstanding mortgage-backed securities, for total asset-backed securities,
and for the breakdown between business and consumer asset-backed securities, are from BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED'L RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS,
SECOND QUARTER 1995, at 82 thl.L.108 "Federally Related Mortgage Pools," 100 tbl.L.132, "Issuers
of Asset-Backed Securities" (Sept. 13, 1995). The numbers for outstanding consumer credit card and
auto loan asset-backed securities are from 81 FED. RES. BULL. A39 tbl.1.55 "Consumer Installment
Credit" (Oct 1995).
213. These numbers are from INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PUBLICATIONS, INC., THE MORTGAGE
MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL FOR 1995 tbls. "Mortgage Security Issuance by Type," "Commercial
MBSs Issued in 1994" (1996) (relying upon Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Inside Mortgage
Securities, which obtains its data from the same sources as the Federal Reserve). The government
sponsored mortgage-backed securities amount is the sum of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and RTC issues listed on the tables, and the private issuer mortgage-backed securities amount is the
sum of the private label issues and the commercial MBSs less the RTC issues. See id. However, Pratt,
supra note 4, includes a total number for mortgage-backed issuances in 1994 of $177.37 billion. See
also Raghavan, supra note 190 (number given is $177. 1).
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Private Issuer Mortgage-Backed Securities 74.88
Total Mortgage-Backed Securities 436.08
Asset-Backed Securities:
Credit Card Securitizations (Consumer) 14  33.00
Auto Loan Securitizations (Consumer) 12.50
Other Consumer and Business Securitizations215  29.50
Total Asset-Backed Securities 75.00
Total Mortgage- andAsset-Backed Securities2 6  511.08
214. ABS Growth Seen Aided By Rise In Credit Card Use, MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER,
Feb. 13, 1995 ($33 billion) [hereinafter, ABS Growth]; Chisholm, supra note 67, at 1 ($32 billion);
Stephen Kleege & Howard Kapiloff, Finance Firms Led In Card, Home Equity Securitizations Last
Year, AM. BANKER, Jan. 23, 1995 ($33 billion).
215. Ford Lease Deal Paves Way For New ABS Structure, MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER,
Mar. 6, 1995.
216. Pratt, supra note 4, includes a total number for asset-backed issuances in 1994 of $75.1692
billion; see also Essenburg, supra note 107; ABS Growth, supra note 214 ($75 billion). The totals for
other consumer and business, and mortgage-backed, securities were derived from the other figures,
These figures may not include commercial paper. Supra note 211; see CP Volume Catching Up With
Term ABS, Outstanding Predicted to Hit $85B in '95, ASSET SALES REP., Jan. 20, 1995, at 1. Also,
because commercial paper is a very short-term obligation, gross issuances would tend to overstate the
volume of such transactions as a proportion of longer-term transactions.
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APPENDIX B: A TYPICAL SECURITIZATION TRANSACTION STRUCTURE
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APPENDIX C: OTHER FINANCING STRUCTURES
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APPENDIX D: THE RECENT REGULATORY HISTORY OF SECURITIZATION
The recent regulatory history of securitization has been discussed by a
variety of commentators; but for differences in emphasis, their stories are
consistent."' This discussion briefly summarizes the literature in this area."
For purposes of recounting this history, it is helpful to distinguish between the
securitization of mortgages and the securitization of receivables, including
mortgages, by banks and other financial institutions (referred to collectively
as "banks").
1. Securitization of Mortgages219
The modem era of securitization began in 1970 when the United States
government created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie
Mac").22 Freddie Mac joined its siblings, Government National Mortgage
Association ("Ginnie Mae") and Federal National Mortgage Administration
("Fannie Mae"; all three collectively, "GSEs" or "government sponsored
entities") in making a secondary market in mortgages-that is, buying and
selling mortgages. Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae had bought and sold
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration ("VA") and the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA").'
By contrast, Freddie Mac's secondary market activities involved
"conventional" mortgages (that is, mortgages that are FHA or VA insured);
conventional mortgages constitute the vast bulk of all mortgages.222
Freddie Mac was authorized, like its siblings, to issue "mortgage-backed
securities."2" Mortgage-backed securities are securities whose repayment is
backed by a pool of mortgages. The pool issues securities; payments on the
securities are made from payments received on the mortgages.224 The original
217. See generally, FRAQKEL, supra note 1, §§ 2.4.2-.3, .6, 6.2; LrrAN, supra note 4, at 13-14;
Puehala, supra note 69, at 153-58; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1383-93, 1395-96, 1403-06.
218. For more discussion on the history of the modem era of securitization, see FRANKEL, supra
note 1, § 6.2; JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM
THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 350-54 (1992); LITAN, supra note 4, at 13-14; Shenker &
Colletta, supra note 1, at 1383-88.
219. See KOHN, supra note 13, at 616-27.
220. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Title I of the Emergency Home Finance
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-531, § 303(a), 84 Stat. 450, 452 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C
§ 1452(a) (1994)).
221. Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 537.
222. FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 6.2.
223. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1455(a), 1719(d) (1994).
224. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 1, at 135.
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mortgage-backed securities were very simple. More complex types of
mortgage-backed securities have since been developed."3
The creation of the GSEs was part of the U.S. government's initiative to
promote and encourage housing, begun in the 1930s as part of New Deal
legislation. 6 The creation of a secondary market in mortgages enables banks
with greater ability to attract deposits and less demand for mortgages to buy
mortgages as investments. It also enables banks with less access to deposits
and more demand for mortgages to resell their mortgages, acquiring more
funds to make more mortgages.227 Thus, more funds become available to
make mortgages, and mortgage rates are equalized throughout the country.
Securities issued by any of the three GSEs are backed, explicitly in the
case of Ginnie Mae and implicitly in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, by the full faith and credit of the United States Treasury.228 Thus,
investors can be assured of full and timely repayment on the securities issued
by any of the three; the securities will be paid even if the underlying
mortgages are not. Therefore, GSEs do not need to pay for credit
enhancement on their securities. They also are exempt from some federal,
state, and local taxes, 9 and federal (and consequently, often, state) securities
laws, including the Securities Act of 19 33'o regarding offerings of securities
and the 1940 Act.3 And, unlike banks, GSEs are not subject to capital
adequacy ratios or reserve requirements, and do not need to pay deposit
232insurance premiums. Thus, they have significant cost advantages over otherissuers of mortgage-backed securities. 33 Nevertheless, starting in the late
225. See KOHN, supra note 13, at 619; Carroll & Lappen, supra note 133, at 81.
226. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Title III of the Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303(a), 84 Stat. 450, 452 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1994)); Federal National Mortgage Association Act, ch. 784, 62 Stat. 1206 (1948)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723h (1994)); Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, sec. 802(c), § 302(a)(2), 82 Stat. 476, 536-37 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2) (1994)). For more discussion on the history of these entities, see FRANKEL, supra
note 1, § 6.2 and CHARLES R. GEISST, VISIONARY CAPITALISM 88-95 (1990).
227. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 2.4.6.
228. Id. § 6.2, at 182 & n.25; Benston, supra note 1, at 72 n.6; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1,
at 1387 n.85. See generally Carroll, supra note 13.
229. David A. Vise, The Financial Giant That's in our Midst, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1995, at Al
(discussing the District of Columbia's frustration over Fannie Mae's exemption from local income
taxes).
230. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1994); see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
231. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (1994); see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
232. The premiums and reserve requirements are unnecessary because the GSEs are backed by the
Treasury. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
233. "Fannie [Mae] pursues a public mission to support the residential housing market, abetted by
[VOL. 74:1061
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1970s, private parties began issuing mortgage-backed securities.3 4 They were
able to exploit several niches unavailable to government issuers such as
adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs"), "jumbo" (large dollar amount)
mortgages, lower quality mortgages ("B", "C", and "D" quality borrowers),
and home equity loans. 5
In 1986, legislation simplifying tax structuring of some complex
mortgage-backed securitization transactions was adopted. Issuers (pools)
meeting certain requirements (called REMICs) were expressly exempted
from federal entity-level tax.36 Moreover, conveyances of mortgages to
REMICs would not involve "sales" for federal income tax purposes. 7
More recently, the U.S. government has, through the Resolution Trust
Company ("RTC"), 8 become involved in securitization of commercial real
estate.239 Until the RTC was formed, securitization of commercial real estate
mortgages had been quite uncommon.240 The large size of the RTC's portfolio
prompted the development of creative solutions to the technical problems in
securitizing commercial real estate mortgages.241 These solutions have served
as a template that the private market is increasingly adopting.42
2. Securitizations by Financial Institutions
In the late 1970s, receivables other than mortgages began to be
distinctly nonprivate benefits that give it, and Freddie, a massive and virtually unassailable competitive
advantage. Without this government backing-exemptions from Securities registration and from state
and local taxes as well as the implicit federal backing that allows it to borrow at below-market rates---
Fannie would be a radically different company, surely less profitable, less important." Carroll, supra
note 13, at 60.
234. THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 2 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 3d ed. 1992);
S&P's CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 79; Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 537.
235. KOHN, supra note 13, at 623-24. Indeed, nongovernmental issuers of residential mortgage-
backed securities concentrate on "jumbo" loans, and unsecuritized ARMs find a ready market among
banks. See Brendan J. Keane, A Greater Element of Risk; Mortgage Products, MORTGAGE BANKING,
May 1995, at 26.
236. See I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G (1980).
237. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
238. The RTC was established by Congress in 1989 to liquidate the assets of insolvent savings and
loan associations. KOHN, supra note 13, at 311; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1404; see also
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501,
103 Stat. 183, 184 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
239. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1404.
240. Id. at 1397-99.
241. Borod, SECURrrIZATION, supra note 1, § 1.04.D; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1404.
242. See Bourrie, supra note 122; see also M. Cathy Anderson Coleman, Back from the Brink,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1995, at 87; Tim Gray, Centura Takes Loans to Wall Street, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Mar. 12, 1995, at F1.
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securitized.243 Banks were responsible for much of the securitization
transaction volume:2' the largest dollar volume of receivables securitized
involves mortgages,24 credit cards, and automobile loans, and many such
receivables are held by banks.2 46 Banks, like other businesses, need funds to
finance their operations, and historical, regulatory, and market forces
combined to make securitization very attractive.247
Starting in the late 1970s, banks seeking financing had to confront
increased competition for deposits.248 Money market funds, mutual funds, and
life insurance companies, among others, also were seeking depositors'
dollars. Banks therefore had to compete by offering depositors higher rates,24 9
and strong banks had to match the rates offered by capital-hungry weaker
banks. Because deposits were backed by Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation insurance (and, formerly, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation insurance), depositors were assured of repayment, regardless of
the financial health of the bank. Hence, depositors considered only the
promised return, not the possibility that the bank would lack funds to pay it.250
These factors made raising money by means of deposits comparatively
expensive.
Similarly, raising financing through stock or debt offerings also was
expensive. Especially during the early 1980s, the financial condition of many
243. Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 538; S&P's CRITERIA, supra note 1, at 61.
244. Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 1.02; see also supra Appendix A.
245. Banks do securitize mortgages, but the vast bulk of mortgage securitizations are done by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. See supra Appendix A. Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie,
however, acquire their mortgages largely from banks. Mortgage Backed Securities Come of Age,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1992, at S2. Moreover, banks themselves also purchase mortgage-
backed securities.
246. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A.
247. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 120 (discussing contemporary developments,
including securitization, that have made the "traditional" banking business obsolete).
248. See generally LITAN, supra note 4, at 9-12.
249. Two pieces of legislation were enacted in the early 1980s to stem the outflow of funds from
banks to money market and mutual funds: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Together, these statutes effectively
ended Regulation Q, which had limited the amount of interest a bank could offer on its deposits. 12
C.F.R. § 217.3 (1980) (Regulation Q); see LITAN, supra note 4, at 9; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1,
at 1390-91.
250. The FDIC insures deposits of up to $100,000 in federally and state chartered banks and
saving and loans. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1994). The FDIC's insurance is backed by
the full faith and credit of the United States Treasury. KOHN, supra note 13, at 760.
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banks was quite weak.2 1 Bank stock and debt offerings were accordingly not
popular in the markets, except at very high prices. Many factors contributed
to the financial weakness of banks. These included the mismatch between
banks' costs of funds and the return on their assets (loans), particularly
mortgages; 253 significant amounts of underperforming assets (loans) because
of lending to less developed countries;" and highly leveraged transactions
(leveraged buyouts). 5
Markets, and regulators, began calling on banks to improve their financial
condition. Regulators needed to specify a measure of financial condition. The
measure they selected was the "capital adequacy ratio., 256 The capital
adequacy ratio attempts to measure whether a bank has sufficient capital
given the riskiness of its loans and other assets. A bank's capital adequacy
ratio is the ratio of its "capital" to its "risk-weighted assets."257 A bank's
capital consists principally of its stockholders' equity and long-term debt. At
least one half of a bank's required capital must consist of stockholders'
equity." A bank's "risk-weighted assets" consist of its assets,259 such as
loans, multiplied by the applicable risk-weighting."
Capital adequacy ratios require a bank to maintain a certain amount of
capital for each "risk-weighted" dollar of its assets."' Obligations of the
United States Treasury, for instance, typically have a zero risk weighting,
whereas corporate loans have a 100% risk weighting.262 Thus, for every
treasury bond a bank holds, it does not need to hold any capital. By contrast,
251. See LITAN, supra note 4, at 1-2, 9-11, 36.
252. See generally KOHN, supra note 13, at 787; LITAN, supra note 4, at 10-11.
253. See KOHN, supra note 13, at 787; LITAN, supra note 4, at 27; Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra
note I, § 1.02.A.3.
254. LITAN, supra note 4, at 17.
255. Id. at 28-29.
256. 12 C.F.R- pt. 208, app. A (1996). Insurance companies, too, are typically subject to
requirements comparable to banks' capital adequacy requirements. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1402
(McKinney 1985).
257. 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (1996).
258. Bored, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 2.02, at 2-13 to 2-14.
259. Defining "assets" can be difficult. Because of the rapid pace of financial innovation, the
definition must frequently be revised to reflect new types of financial instruments, some of which were
created largely to fall outside of the then-existing definition. See generally David Cates, Wanted: A
Way to Show Off-Balance-Sheet Strengths, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 5, 1993, at 18, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File; Financial Exotics-A Threat, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1991, at 53,
available in LEXIS, Banking Library, Usbank File.
260. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1414.
261. Id.
262. 12 C.F.R pt. 208, app. A, attachment 111 (1996).
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for every corporate loan a bank holds, it needs to hold capital equal to the
capital adequacy ratio percentage. If the percentage is 8%, a $100 million
corporate loan requires $8 million of capital. Mortgages, and mortgage-
backed securities issued by private parties, have 50% risk weightings; by
contrast, mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or
Ginnie Mae have a 20% risk weighting. Thus, a $100 GSE mortgage-backed
security requires only two-fifths the capital of a $100 mortgage or a $100
private mortgage-backed security.26
In 1989, the Basle Accords, which are applicable to banks undertaking
international business, were adopted.2" They provide for a capital adequacy
ratio of 8%.265 Banks were required to meet this ratio by the end of 1992.266
Depository institutions not undertaking international business are not subject
to the Basle Accords, but they are subject to comparable regimes with,
perhaps, somewhat lower capital adequacy ratios.267 Compliance, even in
excess of the specified percentages, is considered to favorably impress
regulators.268 The market, while not as easily impressed as the regulators,269
regards the improved financial condition of banks with favor."'
After the adoption of the Basle Accords, many banks sought to improve
263. Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, §§ 1.02.A.1, 2.02.A.1; Shenker & Colletta, supra note
1, at 1415-16. Insurers' capital adequacy requirements also favor securitization securities over the
underlying receivables. See Jinny St. Goar, Commercial MBSs?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1994,
at 225.
264. 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325 (1996) (codifying the Basle Accords); Shenker & Colletta,
supra note 1, at 1414-16. See generally COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY
PRAcTICES, FINAL INTERNATIONAL RISK-BASED CAPITAL STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE BASLE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING (1988), reprinted in 51 BNA'S BANKING REP. 143 (1988).
265. Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 2.02.A.I.
266. Id. § 1.02.A.l, at 1-6.
267. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1414, 1415 n.242.
268. Id. at 1395-96.
269. For a general, and critical, discussion of the capital adequacy ratio as a measure of bank
soundness, see David Fairlamb, Beyond Capital, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1994, at 40,
available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bis File; see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1415 n.242.
Some commentators have suggested that the regulators overemphasized capital adequacy because it is
easy to measure (as opposed to, for instance, quality of management). Fairlamb, supra. This
overemphasis may have contributed to a distortion in bank practices, as banks sought to improve their
capital adequacy ratios at the expense of other ratios which might better have reflected the risks they
faced. See Fairlamb, supra; see also Stuart D. Root, Three Cs of Bank Capital: Convergence,
Conundrums, and Contrariness, 1994 COL. BUS. L. REV. 135, 155-56 & n.64. Banks attempting to
meet capital adequacy ratios have an incentive to substitute interest rate risk for credit risk on their
balance sheets. Id. at 156. Recognizing this, regulators have attempted to establish standards that
would cover interest rate risk as well. Id.
270. Fairlamb, supra note 269, at 40; Steve Klinkerman, Top Banks Pouring Excess Capital into
Buybacks Series, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 1995, at 22.
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their capital adequacy ratios. The banks had two choices. One choice was to
increase their capital. For reasons discussed above, many banks, especially
ones with particularly unfavorable ratios, found this an expensive option. The
other choice was to decrease the riskiness of their assets by selling loans with
high risk weightings (and perhaps replacing them with assets with lower risk
weightings). In many cases, selling loans with high risk weightings seemed
the better choice. Loan sales helped banks meet various ratios,27 and such
sales also helped banks raise financing to make more loans. 2 Some banks
needed more to conform to the ratios than to raise financing. There had been
less demand for bank loans since changes in the federal securities laws made
access to the capital markets273  easier for many borrowers. 4 These
borrowers, too, often had better credit ratings than their banks, increasing the
advantage of capital markets financing." 5
Selling high risk weighted loans decreases the amount of capital a bank
needs.276 This remains true even if the bank invests the proceeds in other
loans (or securities backed by loans), so long as those other loans (or
securities) have a lower risk weighting. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac permit
banks to swap mortgages (with 50% risk weightings) for mortgage-backed
securities (with 20% risk weightings).277
Selling loans also enables banks to reduce certain "regulatory taxes."
"Regulatory taxes" consist of deposit insurance premiums and reserve
requirements under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation D.278 Both are
pegged to deposits. The larger a bank's deposits, the higher the "taxes." If a
bank is holding fewer loans, it needs fewer deposits. Thus, its insurance
premiums and reserve requirements are lower.279
The foregoing benefits relate to loan sales, whether or not in the form of
271. One such ratio is "return on assets." Selling loans can help improve this ratio by decreasing
the amount of assets. This, of course, assumes that the return does not decrease commensurately.
272. LITAN, supra note 4, at 36.
273. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text for a discussion on the difference between
capital markets and other financial markets where firms can raise financing.
274. Rule 415 permits "shelf' registration by a firm of its debt securities. A firm can file one
registration statement for a certain amount of debt, issue only a lesser amount at the time, and as
market "windows" open, issue more debt at very short notice up to the amount included in the "shelf'
registration. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1990); see also LITAN, supra note 4, at 12-17.
275. LITAN, supra note 4, at 17.
276. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1415.
277. See Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, §§ 1.02.A.1, 1.04.A.2-.3.
278. Shenker& Collettasupra note 1, at 1391 n.105.
279. See id. at 1391-92, 1406; Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, § 1.02.A.1; Shenker &
Colletta, supra note 1, at 1391-92, 1406.
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securitization transactions. Securitization offers a better way to sell loans.
Many loans can be sold at once, at a comparatively small discount from their
face value. And, because many securitizations are structured as sales for
accounting purposes, but borrowings for tax purposes, the benefits of
accounting "sales" treatment can be obtained without forsaking the benefits
of tax "borrowing" treatment.280 The seller does not recognize current tax gain
or loss on the "sale" and may deduct the interest paid by the pool to holders of
the pool's debt securities, who are the ultimate purchasers of the
receivables.281
Securitization worked very well to remove lower-quality loans from
banks' balance sheets. Banks were able to remove many problem loans from
their balance sheets in a comparatively short time.212 Indeed, banks' capital
adequacy ratios are now well in excess of the regulatory requirements." 3
Since the initial flurry of securitization activity, subsequent uses of
securitization by banks have been less to achieve desirable ratios and more for
other reasons. Many banks now pursue fee income from activities such as
originating and servicing loans more ardently than "spread" income from
traditional lending activities.284 Securitization helps in this endeavor by
allowing banks to originate and service a greater volume of loans.
280. Supra notes 86, 98 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
282. Michael Hirsh, Why Japan Won't Change, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1994, at 37, 48
("US banks ... sloughed off 1980's bad-debt problems through securitization and other means in just
two years."); see also Borod, SECURITIZATION, supra note 1, §2.01.B.
283. As of August 1994, the average bank's capital adequacy ratio exceeded 13%. Fairlamb, supra
note 269, at 16; see also Dean Tomasula, Banks Well Capitalized But Conservative, Play It Cautious
in Asset-Backed Securities, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1995, at 20.
284. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1392 & nn.109-10.
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